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THE ISTANBUL CONVENTION’S EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS IN
THE LIGHT OF L AWS ON S ELF -DEFENCE AND MITIGATING
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
By Alexandra Molitorisová * and Ciarán Burke **
ABSTRACT
The article argues that the Council of Europe Convention on
Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic
Violence (Istanbul Convention), a comprehensive international treaty,
may necessitate deep changes in its Parties’ domestic legal regimes,
including reconceptualising laws on circumstances excluding or
mitigating criminal responsibility and related evidentiary issues in
domestic violence cases. The article first presents the theoretical
underpinnings of a gendered understanding of violence and criminal
laws. It then proceeds to present different approaches to law reform
that have contemplated gendered laws on circumstances that exclude
criminal responsibility, mostly in the context of homicides committed
by battered women. Traditional approaches to law reform
demonstrate how a gendered reconsideration of a single legal concept
requires reconsideration of all legal principles governing the structure
of that concept and causes a cascade effect. This, in turn, requires
specific evidentiary considerations, including the context in which a
crime is perpetrated, namely the dynamics of abusive partner
relationships, social framework evidence, and the ‘demystification’ of
violence against women. The article suggests that the Istanbul
Convention’s emphasis on investigation and evidence and the
promotion of a “gendered understanding of violence” may potentially
open the question of criminal responsibility of female offenders by
elevating gendered rules of evidence to gendered criminal law
provisions (in a reverse cascade effect).
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@uni-bayreuth.de. An earlier version of the article was presented at the at the
European University Institute Conference “Gender in Law and Courts: Uneasy
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INTRODUCTION
The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (the
Convention) was adopted on 11 May 2011 and came into effect on 1
August 2014. The Convention will impact both common law countries
(Ireland and the UK) and continental jurisdictions within the Council
of Europe (CoE). As of April 2020, thirty-four countries have ratified
the Convention. 1
The Convention will necessitate many structural as well as
technical legal changes in the domestic criminal laws of States Parties

The Convention is semi-open, meaning that States outside of the CoE system may
accede to the Convention.
1
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to the Convention 2, and aims to engender a shift in thinking with
regard to criminal law and domestic violence legislation. 3 Given its
gender-oriented philosophy, it is conceivable that some of these
changes will involve rather dramatic reconsideration of generally
applicable provisions concerning offences against bodily and mental
integrity. 4 The Convention combines general criminal law provisions,
such as on statutes of limitation and sanctioning, with procedural and
substantive provisions. The latter prescribe that Parties take necessary
legislative or other measures to ensure that the intentional commission
of certain acts, such as of sexual violence, including rape, and of acts
which seriously impairing a person’s psychological integrity through
coercion or threats, are criminalised. 5 The Convention positions itself
as a rights-based, victim-centred and gender-sensitive legal
instrument. 6 This, above all, entails that victim protection is viewed
via a gendered prism: the Convention recognises that women are at
greater risk of gender-based violence and are disproportionately
affected by domestic violence. 7 Its object and purpose is to protect
women against all forms of violence and to design a comprehensive
framework of policies and measures for the protection of and
assistance to all victims of violence against women and domestic

See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 210, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://
www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/210/signatures (last
visited Feb. 7, 2021).
3
See Ronagh McQuigg, Domestic Violence: Applying a Human Rights Discourse, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON PROTECTION,
PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION 15-35 (Sarah Hilder & Vanessa Bettinson eds.,
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
4
See Minni Leskinen, The Istanbul Convention on Sexual Offenses: A Duty to Reform
the Wording of National Law or the Way We Think?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: EUROPE AND THE ISTANBUL CONVENTION 133-156
(Johanna Niemi, Lourdes Peroni & Vladislava Stoyanova, eds., Routledge, 2020).
5
Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against
Women and Domestic Violence art. 32-40, opened for signature May 11, 2011,
C.E.T.S. No. 210, https://rm.coe.int/168008482e [hereinafter Convention].
6
See WAVE Fact Sheet Istanbul Convention, WAVE NETWORK & EUROPEAN INFO
CENTRE AGAINST VIOLENCE (Jan. 2016), http://fileserver.wave-network.org/research
reports/2016_WAVEFactSheetIC.pdf.
7
Convention, supra note 5, at preamble.
2
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violence. 8 The stated objective affects all obligations under the
Convention.
This article discusses the changes in national criminal laws of
States Parties that may be required in order to align them with the
Convention. What adjustments does the “gendered understanding of
violence” entail for domestic criminal law? 9
METHODOLOGY
This article engages with national laws from diverse
jurisdictions, but should not be considered as a comparative study.
Jurisdictions treated include several non-Parties to the Convention,
since violence against women is a world-wide problem. However,
amongst the States Parties, this article devotes particular attention to
France and Germany as two of the three largest jurisdictions, that are
signatories of the Convention. 10 The purpose of this approach is to
demonstrate the variability in the legal status quo, which will be
juxtaposed with certain Convention requirements. Again, this article
does not attempt to make conclusions concerning the selected
jurisdictions’ compliance with the Convention. Rather, it represents an
– incomplete – mapping of the extent of a gendered understanding of
violence in national laws. It is, of course, beyond the scope of a single
article to comprehensively cover all possible areas of a legal order
shaped by a gendered understanding of violence. We therefore
focused upon one extreme case – that of a battered woman
experiencing domestic violence and killing her abusive partner in
alleged self-defence. Examining responses of national laws in this
extreme case works as a litmus test concerning the gendered approach
to criminal laws dealing with violence against women. It is possible to
consider this test as the ultimate test of compliance with the “spirit” of
the Convention.
The article proceeds in the following manner: First, it focuses
on providing a general theoretical meaning to the notion of “gendered
understanding of violence.” Examples are predominantly drawn from
Convention, supra note 5, at art. 1(1)(c).
Id. at art. 49(2).
10
Turkey was the second largest, however, in March 2021, it announced withdrawal
from the Convention.
8
9
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French and German law, the Convention, the European Court of
Human Rights’ (ECtHR) case law, and the literature in the area of
criminal law and gendered law reform. This part highlights the conflict
between the Convention’s provisions, which states that it should be
applied to male as well as female victims of domestic violence, and its
promotion of a gendered understanding of violence. Articles 12 and 16
of the Convention, in particular, exemplify this clash. Since this conflict
is readily apparent even at the level of a prima facie reading of the
Convention, we endeavoured to inquire whether it is also present at a
deeper level. Academic literature reveals that the clash between a
gendered understanding of violence and a “de-gendered” approach is
driven by a feminist critique of laws that capture the “male view” of
the world and that are regarded as unjust. 11 In particular, self-defence
laws attract criticism. 12 In this critique, the case of a killing committed
by a battered woman serves as a powerful example of how these laws
operate in extreme circumstances. 13 The proposition made in this
article is that, although the Convention does not specifically regulate
the laws of self-defence, it can have an indirect impact on how they
operate, since the Convention contains an entire chapter covering the
investigation and prosecution of violence against women and
domestic violence, which is becoming a rich source of evidentiary rules
and practices.
The article identifies certain “evidentiary requirements” as an
element of the gendered understanding of violence that mandate or
encourage the use of specific evidence in domestic violence cases, as
well as, potentially, in other cases of violence against women. These
requirements are not explicitly prescribed by Convention’s text;
however, they are found in the Explanatory Report accompanying the
Convention, and may be inferred from the fact that the Convention
See Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254,
279-302 (1992); See also Joanne Conaghan, Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical
Project in Law, 27 J. OF L. & SOC’Y 351 (2000).
12
See Carol Smart, WOMEN, CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE, at 2753 (Routledge, 2013). See also Danielle Tyson, SEX, CULPABILITY AND THE DEFENCE
OF PROVOCATION, at 19-56 (Routledge, 2013).
13
See generally Wendy Chan, A Feminist Critique of Self-Defense and Provocation
in Battered Women’s Cases in England and Wales, 6 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 39-65
(1994); See generally Katherine O’Donovan, Defences for Battered Women Who Kill,
18 J. OF L. & SOC’Y 219-40 (1991).
11
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represents a complex legal regulation for combatting violence against
women and domestic violence. 14 They may be also inferred from the
social scientific evidence on the basis of which the Convention was
drafted. 15 In addition, such requirements may be found in the
documents accompanying the implementation of the Convention. 16 It
is noted that the Convention should not be considered in isolation, and
that, in particular in the CoE system, the rulings of the ECtHR must be
considered. 17 At this point, a further original contribution to the
current scholarship is made, because no other research has addressed
the question of the investigation of domestic violence as a distinct
category of violence against women in the ECtHR case-law. The
argument is then advanced that the Convention represents a more
advanced framework than that of the ECHR in terms of a gendered
perspective on investigation and evidence.
The next step in our analysis was to demonstrate that
evidentiary rules and practices stemming from the Convention have a
more far-reaching impact than is necessarily visible in the day-to-day
work of the police and the prosecution. We hypothesised that the
impact can be sensed in questioning certain substantive criminal laws,
and in particular those that concern self-defence or other defences to
criminal responsibility of battered women. To prove our hypothesis
concerning the ripple effects of the evidentiary requirements, we
examined jurisdictions in which discussions about these effects have
been taking place for a long time, albeit in the opposite direction,
namely starting from considering changes to substantive rules to
considering changes to evidentiary rules. Since the 1950s, common law
jurisdictions have institutionalised a particular process of reforming

Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence ¶¶ 191-192,
¶¶ 277-278 (2011).
15
See Ad Hoc Committee on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women
and Domestic Violence [CAHVIO], Interim Report, at 13-17, CAHVIO 4 FIN (May
27, 2009).
16
See infra, at p. 13-17.
17
See Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom et al., COURTING GENDER JUSTICE: RUSSIA, TURKEY,
AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 171 (Oxford University Press, 2019).
14
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laws by establishing law reform commissions 18 These commissions are
expert bodies which issue recommendations concerning law reform,
to which they arrive via a particular method, namely reviewing how
laws operate in practice, receiving submissions from professionals as
well as the public, and conducting comparative analysis as well as a
literature review. 19 The question of battered woman syndrome and the
laws governing self-defence has represented a hot topic amongst such
commissions. At least in Australia, a veritable smörgåsbord of
approaches to common law defences of self-defence and provocation
has been created following recommendations from law reform bodies
over the last 20 years. 20 We examined every common law jurisdiction
with an established law reform commission, but considered only those
that published a final report with recommendations to the government
concerning the use of self-defence by victims of long-term domestic
abuse, either as a part of a broader review of defences, a review of the
laws of homicide, a legal response to domestic violence, or a review of
the laws of evidence. This analysis was undertaken in order to
demonstrate a series of logical steps that take place between the
external drive for law reform (social scientific evidence), the
substantive law reform (elements of self-defence or other defences),
and the consequences of the change in substantive laws (new
evidentiary requirements). A variety of approaches and outcomes
were evident. However, throughout this variety of approaches, we
believe that we observed a universal method of thinking about
reforms, the objective of which is to “gender” criminal laws and their
operation.
This leads us to the final part of the article in which we
endeavoured to mimic the same method of thinking about law reform
18
See Neil Rees, Chairperson of the Victorian Law Reform Commission, Speaker at
the Australasian Law Reform Agencies Conference 2008: The Birth and Rebirth of
Law Reform Agencies (Sept. 10-12, 2008).
19
See Ciarán Burke & Ray Byrne, CASE STUDIES IN LEGAL RESEARCH
METHODOLOGIES: REFLECTIONS ON THEORY AND PRACTICE (Laura Cahillane &
Jennifer Schweppe eds., 2019).
20
See Julie Stubbs, HOMICIDE, GENDER AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE, at ch. 2 (Kate Fitz-Gibbon & Sandra Walklate eds., 2016); See also
Thomas Crofts & Danielle Tyson, Homicide Law Reform in Australia: Improving
Access to Defences for Women Who Kill Their Abusers, 39 MONASH UNIV. L. REV.,
864-893 (2014).
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prompted by a gendered understanding in the context of the
Convention. We considered in detail the laws of homicide of France
and Germany. The article argues that the consequences of a gendered
understanding of violence are predominantly to be found in opening
the question of criminal responsibility of female offenders by elevating
gendered rules of evidence to gendered criminal law provisions.
THE CONVENTION’S GENDERED UNDERSTANDING OF VIOLENCE
The Convention prescribes in Article 18(2), relating to general
obligations, that Parties shall have regard to a gendered understanding
of violence against women and domestic violence in taking the
necessary legislative and other measures to protect all victims from
any further acts of violence covered by the scope of the Convention.
What exactly the Convention means by a “gendered understanding”
must be located elsewhere in the Convention, as well as inferred from
its general tenor. The Convention is predicated upon the
understanding that: (i) violence against women is a manifestation of
historically unequal power relations between women and men; (ii)
violence against women as a social mechanism of a structural nature
forces women into a subordinate position; and that (iii) domestic
violence affects women disproportionately. 21 Having regard to the
ideological underpinnings of the Convention, it must, however, be
possible to understand the practical consequences of the prescribed
gendered approach to violence in criminal justice systems.
Theoretically, a gendered understanding of offences may
reflect itself in various considerations: first by differentiating (i.e.
explicitly legislating for) violent offences specifically aimed against
women from general violent offences against bodily and mental
integrity. This approach may be driven by three rationales: (i) by
recognising a special (different) value of women’s lives and bodily and
physical integrity as compared to those of men; (ii) by recognising a
statistically important representation of a particular gender in the

Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating
violence against women and domestic violence, at 1-2, No.210 (2011).
21

2021 ISTANBUL CONVENTION'S EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS 217
victim population 22 or the offender population; 23 or (iii) by recognising
the motive of the perpetrator, as a stand-alone element of the criminal
offence. 24 The final rationale proposes that a perpetrator may be
charged with a relevant offence if a violent act was directed against
women “because they are women, that is, because of socially
constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a given
society considers appropriate for women.” 25 Therefore, in the most
explicit fashion, the gendered understanding of violence may be
located in the formulation of the offences covered by the Convention.
Under the Convention, it is not sufficient to prosecute female genital
mutilation as a form of bodily harm (Körperverletzung 26 or des atteintes
volontaires à l’intégrité de la personne 27) or forced marriage as coercion
(Nötigung 28). 29 Gendered offences are already enumerated in several

It is difficult to argue that the offence of bodily injury (or physical violence, using
the Convention’s terms) is a gendered offence, however, if a legislator differentiates
domestic violence as a special type of physical violence, then the recorded statistics
of such crime shows that victims and perpetrators are divided according to the gender
line. According to Walby and Towers, when harm as well as act is included, the gender
asymmetry of domestic violence becomes visible. See Sylvia Walby and Jude Towers,
Measuring Violence to End Violence: Mainstreaming Gender, 1 JOURNAL OF GENDERBASED VIOLENCE 1, 11 (2017). See also Sylvia Walby and Jude Towers, Untangling
the Concept of Coercive Control: Theorizing Domestic Violent Crime, 18
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1, 20 (2018) (arguing that domestic violence is
gender asymmetrical at all levels of seriousness and frequency).
23
See Darrell Steffensmeier & Emilie Allan, Gender and Crime: Toward a Gendered
Theory of Female Offending, 22 ANN. REV. OF SOCIO., 459 (1996). It is also possible
to consider crimes such as infanticide committed by a mother to be gendered in this
way.
24
See also Karen Boyle, What’s in the Name? Theorising the Inter-relationships of
Gender and Violence, 20 FEMINIST THEORY 1, 1 (2018).
25
Per the definition of the Convention Article 3(c), if gender is conceived as a motive,
its definition per the Convention bears utmost significance. See Council of Europe
Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic
Violence, Council of Eur., art. 3(c) (2011).
26
STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], § 223, translation at https://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html (Ger.).
27
CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 221-1 – 221-11-1 (Fr.).
28
Id. at § 240.
29
Domestic legislation may also implement the Convention’s explicit formulation of
offenses differently. For example, a new criminal offense of coercive control that
criminalises psychological violence under Article 42 of the Convention was included
22
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(but not all) of the continental criminal codes. 30 These codes may also
contain other gendered crimes not explicitly covered by the
Convention, such as forced prostitution (Zwangsprostitution 31), nonconsensual termination of pregnancy 32 or forced concealment of the
face (dissimulation forcée du visage 33). In some states, calls for legislating
for femicide as a separate criminal offence from homicide should be
noted. 34
Second, it is possible to promote a gendered understanding of
offences by establishing qualified offences (qualifizierte Straftaten,
infractions aggrevées), which effectively create a separate criminal
offence from the basic offence, and therefore, again, to recognise a
special value or qualities of the protected object – here women’s lives
and health and their particular vulnerabilities in the face of violence.
For example, an attack against a pregnant woman is automatically an
aggravating factor in various jurisdictions in relation to many
offences. 35
Third, a gendered understanding in criminal procedural law
may be linked to providing special measures of protection for female
victims, such as interviews led by a female police officer or by
establishing rape crisis centres for victims of sexual violence. 36
in the Irish Domestic Violence Act 2018. Irish Domestic Violence Act 2018 (Act No.
6/2018) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2018/act/6/enacted/en/html.
30
Strafgesetzbuch, supra, note 26 at § 237.
31
Id. at § 232.
32
See Vo v. France, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 42, 58.
33
Code Penal, supra note 27, at Art. 225-4-10.
34
Kiteri Garcia, Peut-on imagine une infraction de femicide en France?, THE
CONVERSATION, https://theconversation.com/peut-on-imaginer-une-infraction-de
-feminicide-en-france-71511#:~:text=Il%20y%20a%20deux%20ans,sur%20le%
20th%C3%A8me%20du%20f%C3%A9minicide (last updated Aug. 26, 2019); See
also Elisa Leray& Elda Monsalve, Un crime de feminicide en France? A propos de
l’article 171 de la loi relative a l’egalite et a la citoyennete, LA REVUE DES
DEOITS DE L’HOMME, Feb. 2017.
35
Code Penal, supra note 27 at Art. 221-4 al. 9.
36
See Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against
Women and Domestic Violence, Council of Eur., art. 25, 2011. See Liz Kelly,
Mapping support services for victims of violence against women in line with the
Istanbul Convention Standards, Council of Eur. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.coe.int/
en/web/genderequality/-/mapping-support-services-for-victims-of-violence-againstwomen-in-line-with-the-istanbul-convention-standards. See also Nadera Shalhoub-
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Fourth, sanctions may be provided for that reflect the
gendered nature of the offences in question. For example, the
Convention prescribes that the measures relating to perpetrators of
offences covered by the Convention include withdrawal of parental
rights 37 – a measure that is often divisive according to gender lines. 38
A gendered approach to sanctions also entails a prohibition on
mitigating sentences on the grounds of custom, tradition, or honour
for perpetrators of violence against women. 39 It is also possible to
“gender” the punishment of offences by establishing aggravating
sentencing factors. In France, it is a general aggravating factor at the
sentencing stage if a crime is committed against another person
because of his or her sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity. 40
Fifth, it is possible to promote a gendered understanding of
offences by providing for other legal concepts that reflect a gendered
approach to violence against women, its consequences and impact.
This especially concerns the proposition that, on average, women find
themselves in a weaker socio-economic position 41 than men. 42 Such a
gendered approach may not be explicitly found in the Convention. As
such, obligations on custody and visitation rights per Article 31, on
Kevorkian and Enda Erez, Integrating a Victim Voice in Community. Policing: A
Feminist Critique, 9 Int’l R. of Victimology, 113-115 (2002).
37
According to GREVIO, in the context of domestic violence the exercise of joint
custody is regarded as a means for the aggressor to continue maintaining domination
over the women and the children. See GREVIO Rapport d’évaluation de référence
France, Council of Eur. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://rm.coe.int/grevio-inf-2019-16/1680
98c619 (last visited May 24, 2020).
38
See Linda D. Elrod and Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in
Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAMILY L. QUARTERLY
3, 381-418 (2008).
39
Opuz v. Turkey App no 33401/02 (ECtHR, 9 September 2009), at 91-95, 101-106
and 196.
40
Code penal, supra, note 27 at Art.132-77.
41
See Ingrid Westendorp, The Istanbul Convention; new perspectives for victims of
domestic violence? MAASTRICHT UNIV. (June 8, 2018), https://www.maastricht
university.nl/blog/2018/06/istanbul-convention-new-perspectives-victims-domesticviolence.
42
As per ¶115 of the Explanatory Report to the Istanbul Convention: “[Gendered
understanding] means that services offered need to demonstrate an approach, relevant
to their users, which recognises the gendered dynamics, impact and consequences of
these forms of violence and which operates within a gender equality and human rights
framework.”
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legal aid per Article 57, or on compensation per Article 30, are
formulated in a gender-neutral fashion, as they relate to all victims of
violent acts covered by the Convention. They also do not provide for
factoring in gender in designing legislative or other measures. For
example they could provide for higher compensation for female
victims, limit the right to legal assistance to women victims, or state
that in the determination of custody and visitation rights of children, 43
incidents of violence perpetrated by men should be taken into
account. 44 Such measures are not completely inconceivable if the
drafters “aim at the empowerment and economic independence of
women victims of violence” 45 but are probably dissonant with the
meaning of justice and equality as developed in the CoE system, as it
assumes a balancing act between individual rights to family life, nondiscrimination, and effective remedies. 46
On a separate track of the analysis, a gendered understanding
may follow the proposition that instead of creating new criminal law
rules that would mitigate gender inequality, existing criminal law
rules are already gendered in the sense that they disadvantage
women. 47 According to this view, criminal law rules must be amended
to rectify their inherent gender bias. It is asserted that the existing
criminal justice system was built for men by men and may become “a
site of re-victimisation and injustice” in cases involving women, and
especially female victims of domestic violence. 48 Such consequences
See Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against
Women and Domestic Violence, Council of Eur., art. 30-31, 57, 2011.
44
Although it is true that in the countries’ evaluations, GREVIO is exclusively
concerned with the safety of mothers who are victims of domestic violence and their
children in the decision on and exercise of child custody and visitation rights. See 1st
General Report on Grevio’s Activites, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Apr. 2020), https://rm.coe.
int/1st-general-report-on-grevio-s-activities/16809cd382.
45
Convention, supra note 21 at Art 18(3).
46
See Ivana Radacic, Gender Equality Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights, 19 THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L, 2008, at 841.
47
Or de-gendered criminal rules as a default state, depending on the point of view.
48
See Kate Fitz-Gibbon & Marion Vannier, Domestic Violence and the Gendered Law
of Self-Defence in France: the Case of Jacqueline Sauvage, 25 FEMINIST LEGAL
STUDIES 3, 31č (2017). See also Elizabeth Sheehy and Barbara Hamilton, Thrice
Punished: Battered Women, Criminal Law and Disinheritance, 8 SOUTHERN CROSS
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 96, 104-105 (2004). See also Anthony Hopkins and Patricia
Easteal, Walking in Her Shoes: Battered Women Who Kill in Victoria, Queensland
43
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may manifest themselves vis-à-vis both female perpetrators as well as
female victims – for example, because certain general mitigating
circumstances may be applied to female perpetrators only with
difficulty, whereas they are more favourably applied to male
perpetrators, 49 or because certain legal doctrines such as self-defence
were constructed according to male behaviour or not even recognising
women’s capacity. 50 Historically, this could also be observed in
making available the defence of coercion at common law, which could
be advanced by a wife who committed a crime in the presence of her
husband. It was presumed that she acted under coercion, entitling her
to be excused from responsibility. 51 A gender bias may also affect
certain sanctions, such as the ban on entry to sporting, cultural, and
other social events (for example, football banning orders), which are
predominantly imposed on male perpetrators. 52 It can also be argued,
hypothetically, that certain criminal offences such as the criminal
offence of failure to help after a car accident 53 may be less favourably
applied to female offenders because men fear injury less than women
and manage distress better than women. 54 A gendered understanding
of violence, de nouveau, would thus call for accounting for the special
qualities and vulnerabilities of female perpetrators or female victims
and Western Australia, 35 ALTERNATIVE LAW JOURNAL 3, 132 (2010). See also
Barbara Hudson, Beyond White Man’s Justice: Race, Gender and Justice in Late
Modernity, 10 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 1, 29 (2006).
49
For example, if a perpetrator has taken the initiative to eliminate the harmful
consequences of the crime or has voluntarily compensated for the damage caused his
or her criminal sanction will be decreased. However, this mitigating factor is based on
the premise that women who find themselves in a worse socio-economic situation will
be fulfilled with more difficulty.
50
The gendered argument for self-defense is that the law of self-defense was built
around cases of a one-time fight of men of equal size and strength. See Fitz-Gibbon &
Vannier, supra 48, at 313 (citing Cass. Crim. 16 October 1979).
51
The abolition of the defence was recommended as early as 1845. See the Law
Commission (Law Com. No. 83) Report on Defences of General Application (1977).
52
See Emma Poulton, Football Hooliganism, in Bonnie Fisher and Steven Lab, eds.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VICTIMOLOGY AND CRIME PREVENTION (SAGE Publications, ebook, 2010).
53
§ 151 zákona č. 40/2009 Sb., trestní zákonník.
54
See William R. Smith & Marie Torsenssson, Gender Differences in Risk Perception
and Neutralizing Fear of Crime: Toward Resolving the Paradoxes, 37 THE BRITISH
JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 4, 608 (1997).
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in criminal law. 55 If a legal rule is applied to both genders with equal
results, such a rule cannot be said to be gendered. 56
The Convention states that it requires a gendered
understanding of domestic violence, 57 but recognises that men may
also be victims of domestic violence, and Parties are encouraged to
apply the Convention to all victims of domestic violence. 58 This can
only mean that the application of the Convention is gendered with
regard to certain aspects of preventing and combatting domestic
violence, while with regard to other aspects, it could remain gender
neutral. This clash between the Convention’s prescription that States
Parties should apply its provisions to all victims of domestic violence
and its mandating of a gendered understanding of violence is already
apparent in Group of Experts on Action against Violence against
Women and Domestic Violence, the Convention’s expert monitoring
group’s (GREVIO) 59 evaluations of Parties’ compliance. In the
Netherlands, GREVIO criticised policy documents that aimed to be
gender neutral on domestic violence despite recognising that the
underlying reason for such policy documents was the underreporting
of domestic violence by men. 60 GREVIO, however, noted that “such
One must also take account of the de-gendering movement. Consider the difference
between the statutory definition of rape per the Slovak Criminal Code (Section
199(1)): “Any person who, by using violence or the threat of imminent violence,
forces a woman to have sexual intercourse with him...,” and the Czech Criminal Code
(Section 185(1)), according to which whoever forces another person to have sexual
intercourse by violence or by a threat of violence, or a threat of other serious
detriment... However, the legislator may also acknowledge that domestic abuse is a
gendered crime yet prefer the statutory definition to be gender-neutral so that no victim
is inadvertently excluded from protection. See Home Office, ‘Government Response
to the report from the Joint Committee on the draft Domestic Abuse Bill’ (Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2019) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
government-response-to-the-report-from-the-joint-committee-on-the-draft-domesticabuse-bill.
56
In fact, if that weren’t the case, the difference between gendered and gender-neutral
rules would not exist.
57
Convention, supra note 21 at Art. 18(3).
58
Convention, supra note 21 at Art. 1(1)(c).
59
GREVIO — Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and
Domestic Violence.
60
GREVIO, Baseline Evaluation Report Netherlands, GREVIO, ¶¶ 29-30, (January
2020), https://rm.coe.int/09000016809a61f1.
55
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considerations lead to the problematic effect that violence against
women is not recognised as a specific, widespread and gender-based
form of violence” that differs in severity and types and in the fact that
vast majority of perpetrators (even where the victim is male) are men. 61
According to GREVIO, this runs contrary to the obligation of paying
particular attention to women victims of gender-based violence as set
out in Article 2(2) of the Convention. 62 Moreover, GREVIO has
recently criticised the gender-neutral approach of legal provisions and
policy documents that address domestic violence in countries such as
Albania, Denmark and Finland. 63
Thus, it is crucial to understand the extent to which the
Convention is gendered and in what way it can be applicable to men
who are victims of domestic violence. One must be cautious when
searching for a gendered understanding of domestic violence within
the Convention. 64 Certainly, a textual reading may identify some
gendered provisions: explicit references to female victims appear in
certain articles, which would suggest that other provisions may relate
to both male and female victims of domestic violence where no such
explicit reference occurs. The obligation to establish shelters, per
Article 23, for example, relates to victims, although especially to women
and their children, which suggests that male victims could also be
covered by the scope of this article. A second approach involves
combining a textual reading with a teleological interpretation of the
relevant provisions. There are two provisions that most likely
implicate a gendered differentiation of domestic violence: Article 16,
which envisages preventive intervention against (male) perpetrators
61

Id.
Id. at ¶ 30.
63
GREVIO, supra note 44, at 25.
64
According to McQuigg, “[d]omestic violence is repeatedly separated out as a term
within the Convention from violence against women generally. This relates to a
broader issue as to whether a gender-neutral approach should be adopted towards
domestic violence or whether a gendered approach is appropriate, a matter which has
already raised substantial debate.” McQuigg therefore argues that the Convention
seeks to strike a compromise between a gender-neutral approach and an approach
conceptualising domestic violence as a form of violence against women only. Ronagh
McQuigg, Domestic Violence: Applying a Human Rights Discourse, in Sarah Hilder
and Vanessa Bettinson, eds. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES
ON PROTECTION, PREVENTION, at 27 (Palgrave McMillan, 2016).
62
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of domestic violence and Article 12, which may be seen as casting selfdefence and other prevention measures as an intervention that
contributes to improving women’s agency and reducing their
vulnerability to violence. 65
Article 16 prescribes that Parties should establish or support
programmes aimed at teaching perpetrators of domestic violence to
adopt non-violent behaviour in interpersonal relationships with a
view to preventing further violence and changing violent behavioural
patterns. As the Explanatory Report makes clear, the Convention
prescribes certain core elements to such programmes, which explicitly
assume that those programmes will be visited by male perpetrators of
domestic violence, as they “should encourage [them] . . . to examine
their attitudes and beliefs towards women.” 66 Moreover, a collection
of papers on the Convention’s implementation introduces two sample
curricula which are directed at adult male perpetrators. 67 Therefore,
although the Article is formulated in a gender-neutral fashion
regarding roles of victims/perpetrators, its implementation may be
strongly conditioned by gender. According to Article 12, Parties
should take necessary measures to prevent all forms of violence, and
especially encourage men and boys to contribute actively to such
prevention. 68 Under this Article, preventive measures at the societal
level are strongly gender determined and focus on masculinity,
devaluing women, male entitlement, honour codes and the masculine
self. 69 A handful of other preventive measures are constructed in a
Opponents of the Convention warn against the breadth of Article 12 which may
become a vehicle for substantially redrafting educational material. See ADF
International, Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence
against Women and Domestic Violence and Possible European Union Accession to it
(May 12, 2017) https://adflegal.blob.core.windows.net/international-content/docs/
default-source/default-document-library/resources/media-resources/europe/istanbulconvention-extensive-memo.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
66
Convention, supra note 21 at 104.
67
The US Duluth programme and the Swedish Integrated Domestic Abuse
Programme.
68
Convention, supra, note 21 at 88.
69
Marianne Hester and Sarah-Jane Lilley, Preventing Violence Against Women:
Article 12 of the Istanbul Convention, in A COLLECTION OF PAPERS ON THE COUNCIL
OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON PREVENTING AND COMBATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 11 (Council of Europe, 2014), https://rm.coe.int/16800d383
a.
65
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gender-neutral fashion, such as poverty pockets, family stress, alcohol
and drug abuse and early trauma. 70 Article 12 encompasses a plethora
of tools, including self-defence training linked to the reduction of
victimisation, challenging stereotypes and empowering women. 71
Most likely, it will prove difficult to find proponents of the proposition
that self-defence training of men or changing the pattern of devaluing
men would constitute an effective means of preventing female-onmale domestic violence. As McQuigg notes, these Articles reveal the
Convention as far from gender neutral on issues of domestic
violence. 72
THE CONVENTION’S IMPLEMENTATION AND EVIDENCE IN DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CASES
The Convention’s ambivalent nature, as gender-neutral
and/or gendered, renders its applicability problematic with regard to
male victims of domestic violence, and in some respects, to female
perpetrators of domestic violence. 73 This problematic applicability is
70

Id.
Resolution on the Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion, by the
European Union, of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, Eur. Parl.Doc. (COM(2016)0109 –
2016/0062(NLE)), (Sep.12, 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?
uri=CELEX%3A52017IP0329.
72
McQuigg, supra note 64, at 32.
73
Female-to-male violence exists. One may debate its extent, nature, severity or
collection of data. Two types of domestic violence are usually distinguished: intimate
terrorism and situational violence. Whereas situational violence affects men to the
same degree as women, in intimate terrorism. See Jessica Eckstein, Intimate Terrorism
and Situational Couple Violence: Classification Variability Across Five Methods to
Distinguish Johnson’s Violent Relationship Types, 32 VIOLENCE VICTIMOLOGY 6, 955
(2017); see also Marianne I. Lien and Jørgen Lorentzen, MEN’S EXPERIENCE OF
VIOLENCE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS, Palgrave Studies in Victims and Victimology,
157 (2019). Data also suggests that men and women have different motivations for
using violence, with women usually protecting themselves or their children, retaliating
their partner’s violence and expressing fear and anger and men acting coercively in an
attempt to control their partners. See Rochelle Braaf and Isobelle Meyering, The
Gender Debate in Domestic Violence: The Role of Data, Australian Domestic and
Family Violence Clearinghouse, Issues Paper 25 (2013) (suggesting in almost half of
the cases where the perpetrator of domestic violence is a woman, the male victim had
previously committed violence against her).
71
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also underlined by the fact that the Convention was drafted on the
basis of evidence that showed a predominant gender pattern in
domestic violence, 74 whereas there are other solid studies that show
that gender differences are relatively small in cases of milder forms of
physical domestic violence, and that both men and women are
frequently subjected to control and abuse in relationships. 75 Moreover,
the respective roles of victims and perpetrators, from a legal point of
view, both in symmetrical (equally perpetrated by men and women)
and asymmetrical conflicts, 76 may swap rapidly. 77
The clash between gendered and gender-neutral approaches to
domestic violence is, however, not unique to the Convention. For a
long time, the clash was subject to a feminist critique of laws that
capture the “male view” of the world and that are regarded as unjust. 78
In this critique, the operation of the laws of self-defence have become
a paradigmatic case in point. 79 Cases of women killing their abusive
partners have become one of the longest debated and best-known
examples of the gender tension in criminal laws in many
jurisdictions. 80 Under the most extreme paradigm, one may imagine

See CAHVIO, supra note 15; see also Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human
Rights, The Istanbul Convention protects women, without hidden purposes, 25 (2018)
https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/the-istanbul-convention-protectswomen-without-hidden-purposes.
75
See Lien & Lorentzen, supra note 73. See also Braaf & Meyering, supra note 73, at
1,10 (observing that family conflict researchers argue that family violence is equally
perpetrated by men and women and that men and women are similarly motivated to
use violence).
76
See Michaels S. Kimmel, “Gender Symmetry” in Domestic Violence, 8 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 11, 1332-63 (2002).
77
See Jiří Hořák, TRESTNEP̌ RÁVNÍ A KRIMINOLOGICKÉ ASPEKTY VRAZD
̌ (PhD Thesis,
Charles University in Prague, 2010).
78
See Carol Smart, supra note 12 at 19-56.
79
See Joshua Dressler, Feminist (or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law: Some
Critical Reflections, 93 MARQUETTE L, REV. 4, 1477-81 (2010); Victoria Nourse, Selfdefense, in Markus Dirk Dubber and Tatjana Hörnle, eds. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF CRIMINAL LAW, Oxford University Press, 623-24 (2014).
80
See Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, GEO. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER, 12-106 (1997); see also
Alexandra Lysova, Victims but also Perpetrators: Women’s Experiences of Partner
Violence, in Helmut Kury, Slawomir Redo and Evelyn Shea, eds. WOMEN AND
CHILDREN AS VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS: BACKGROUND, PREVENTION,
74
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that a woman suffering from so-called battered woman syndrome who
killed her abusive partner in a non-confrontational situation advances
a claim of self-defence to avoid criminal responsibility. 81 Cases in
which deadly force is employed in response to a relatively minor threat
or assault also appear problematic. 82 Depending on the jurisdiction,
the woman’s actions may fall within the legal definition of selfdefence, but may also be considered “excessive,” fall within the legal
definitions of other defences, or may not fit the legal definitions of
circumstances excluding/mitigating criminal responsibility at all. It is
often argued that the legal definitions of defences in many jurisdictions
do not accommodate the experiences of women who kill in response
to long-term grave domestic violence and who therefore cannot escape
criminal responsibility. 83 The idea is that the case of women in
situations of domestic violence is fundamentally different not only to
that of the general population, but also to male victims of domestic
violence. 84
The Convention’s applicability to such cases has the potential
to be especially controversial. The Convention does not explicitly
provide for gendered rules of self-defence or other defences. The
Explanatory Report only notes that other legally justifiable acts, for
example, acts committed in self-defence, in defence of property, or for
necessary medical procedures, would not give rise to criminal
sanctions under the Convention. 85 However, the Convention is a
comprehensive legal text in the area of criminal law and domestic
violence, mandating a gendered approach; it therefore likely has a
certain stance, and it is difficult to imagine it permitting diverging
practices on this issue amongst its Parties. As already noted by
GREVIO, charging victims for injuries inflicted upon the abuser in selfdefence is considered a form of secondary victimisation, and is
REINTEGRATION: SUGGESTIONS FOR SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS, Springer Int’l Pub’g,
505-37, (2016).
81
See Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not
Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 217, 229-231 (2002).
82
See Aileen McColgan, In Defence of Battered Women who Kill, 13 OXFORD
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 4, 508–529 (1993).
83
Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, REVIEW OF THE LAW OF HOMICIDE
ch. 4, 158 https://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/_files/p97-ch04.pdf.
84
See McColgan, supra note 82, at 514.
85
Convention, supra note 21, at 156.
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therefore incompatible with the Convention. 86 Currently, diverging
practices exist within the CoE on this issue. Looking at the German
example, the lower courts have denied any defences and excuses to
battered defendants, and have dealt with long-term abuse at the
sentencing stage only. 87 Perpetrators who kill their intimate partners
via open aggression are likely to face a lower sentence that victims who
kill their intimate partners while they are asleep. 88 Separately, the
French Assemblée Nationale is currently debating a legislative proposal
that would introduce a special defence to criminal responsibility based
on a history of domestic violence. 89 The proposal arose in the context
of a deep public sentiment of injustice originating from the Jacqueline
Sauvage case, which ended with a complete Presidential pardon in
2016. 90 The UK Government has pledged to consider a new defence
based upon a history of domestic violence in the future. 91 The
subsequent chapters of this article will provide a more thorough
analysis of the controversies around the various English, French, and
German laws of homicide, self-defence, and domestic violence.
Without containing explicit gendered provisions, the
Convention may secure a converging gendered approach via other
means, namely evidentiary rules and practice. 92 Evidence comes to the
fore with the centrality of investigations in domestic violence and
other criminal law cases. 93 Investigations relate to the obligation of due
diligence enshrined in Article 5 that represents one of the overarching
obligations, and more specifically in Article 49(2). According to Article
54 (Investigations and evidence), “Parties shall take the necessary
GREVIO, supra note 44, at 25.
Kerstin Braun, Till Death Us Do Part: Homicide Defences for Women in Abusive
Relationships- Similar Problems-Different Responses in Germany and Australia, 23
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 10, 1 (2017).
88
Id. at 9.
89
See infra at p. 43 and note 284.
90
See Fitz-Gibbon & Vannier, supra 48, at 316-19.
91
The UK Government Response to the report from the Joint Committee, supra note
55.
92
Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms,
19 HARVARD WOMEN’S L. J. 127, 1996.
93
See Elisabeth McDonald, Gender Bias and the Law of Evidence: The Link between
Sexuality and Credibility, 24 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 175 (1993); see also
GREVIO, Evaluation of Italy (Oct. 30, 2018), www.befreecooperativa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/GREVIO-REPORT-FINAL-convertito.pdf.
86
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legislative or other measures to ensure that, in any civil or criminal
proceedings, evidence relating to the sexual history and conduct of the
victim shall be permitted only when it is relevant and necessary.” This
Article particularly regards the prosecution of sexual offence. Yet, the
Explanatory memorandum shows clearly that the purpose of this
provision is to combat “the perpetuation of damaging stereotypes,”
and it calls for a context-sensitive assessment of evidence in the
investigation and prosecution of violence against women. 94 Certain
evidence relating to the behaviour of victims should not lead to moral
judgments, seeing the victim as “immoral” and “not worthy” of legal
protection, thereby creating inequality before law. 95 The provision is
otherwise silent on specific evidence in domestic violence cases and
circumstances of self-defence.
GREVIO has already made a number of observations on
investigations and evidence in such cases. Per GREVIO, thorough
investigations are necessary to differentiate between ill-treatment that
would amount to habitual crime and individual episodes of violence,
which cannot be ascribed to a pattern of abusive behaviour. 96 In this
regard, GREVIO criticised Italian investigations for not even
attempting to put together enough information to reconstruct a pattern
of behaviour that would enable its proper classification. It also
condemned any legal classification of violence against women based
on victim’s tolerance, without making a complaint or defending
herself. 97 In its report on Finland, GREVIO noted that the Finnish
police focus excessively on evidence of physical violence, and do not
take into account the context and history of violence and primary
aggressor analysis, such that if there is “mutual violence” both persons
will be viewed as perpetrators and victims. 98 GREVIO therefore
“underscore[d] the importance of a diligent response of the statutory
agencies in investigating allegations of domestic violence, based on a
proper understanding of the nature and cycles of violence in intimate
Convention, supra note 21, at 191, 277.
Id. at 277.
96
GREVIO. ‘Baseline Evaluation Report Italy’. GREVIO/Inf(2019)18 (Council of
Europe, 2020), ¶ 15.
97
Id. at ¶ 14.
98
GREVIO, Baseline Evaluation Report Finland, GREVIO/Inf (2019) 9 (Council of
Europe, 2019).
94
95
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partnerships.” 99 The consequences of a sluggish investigative
approach are not confined to the extreme cases of battered women
killings but affect day-to-day protection of victims of domestic
violence, for example by not being able to obtain barring or protection
orders and access to justice. 100
In this way, the Convention links evidentiary rules and
practice to access to justice: 101 gender stereotypes and cultural
attitudes towards women represent barriers to justice, 102 as well as
discriminatory or gender-blind frameworks which do not take into
account women’s social situations. 103 Therefore, in the investigation
and prosecution of cases of violence against women and domestic
violence, it is compliant with the Convention to use expert testimonies
to dispel myths or misconceptions surrounding domestic violence and
to provide context for victim behaviour. 104 A Training of Trainers Manual
based on the Convention, and written for the CoE, for example, states
that it is a common myth that women are as violent as men and that
“controversies about these figures are because women do use violence
against their partner often as a reaction or defence to the abuse.” 105
Evidence of prior incidents of violence may be particularly relevant in

GREVIO — Report Italy, supra note 96, at ¶ 16.
Id. at ¶ 15.
101
See Shazia Choudhry, Women’s Access to Justice: A Guide for Legal Practitioners
(October 2018) https://rm.coe.int/advanced-womens-access-to-justice-eng/16808e99
ef (last visited 14 October 2019).
102
GREVIO encouraged French authorities to continue developing, including through
training, a non-stereotypical understanding of the phenomenon of violence against
women by law enforcement. See GREVIO -Rapport France, supra note 37, ¶ 229.
103
Konul D. Gasimova, Guideline on Gender-Sensitive Approach for Adjudicating
Gender-Based Violence Cases, http://www.fbih.cest.gov.ba/images/doclink/GenderGuideline---WB-JTIs.pdf (last visited 14 October 2019).
104
Id. Gasimova also suggests that battered woman syndrome must be taken into
consideration by relevant authorities and that justice actors should be aware of the
impact of trauma such as one relating to victim’s perplexing behaviour and other
patterns.
105
Anna C. Baldry & Elisabeth Duban, Improving the Effectiveness of Law
Enforcement and Justice Officers in Combatting Violence against Women and
Domestic Violence (Council of Europe, 2016) https://rm.coe.int/16806acdfd (last
visited 2 January 2020).
99
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proving the extent of harm and predicting risks. 106 Furthermore, social
framework experts107 should be considered in addition to clinical
experts in order to explain victim behaviour. 108 Accordingly, when
reviewing evidence, judges need to consider the dynamics of domestic
violence and its impact on victim behaviour when reviewing evidence.
The Convention also prescribes that Parties must enable victims to be
heard, to supply evidence and have their views, needs, and concerns
presented and considered. 109
These are very detailed evidentiary rules. They mandate not
only what evidence is admissible but also what evidence is relevant
and probative and what needs to be brought into a case. They tell
judicial and police authorities what information to cast doubt upon,
and when to call in experts to interpret the information. As is visible at
the level of monitoring of the Convention’s implementation, gendered
evidentiary rules and practices have the primary power to affect the
applicability of the Convention in domestic violence cases.
ECTHR CASE-LAW ON INVESTIGATION AND EVIDENCE IN DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CASES
The Convention does not exist in a vacuum and is thus not the
only source of gendered rules and practices in investigation and
evidence. Other legal sources may be considered, particularly Article
2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

See Council of Europe, Preventing and Combating Domestic Violence against
Women, A Learning Resource for Training Law Enforcement and Justice Officers
(January 2016) https://rm.coe.int/16805970c1 (last visited 14 October 2019). It is said
that the 2016 learning resource is firmly grounded on the standards of the Istanbul
Convention and on good practice in implementing these standards.
107
To the shift from clinical to social framework evidence, see Rebecca Bradfield,
Understanding the Battered Woman Who Kills her Violent Partner — The
Admissibility of Expert Evidence of Domestic Violence in Australia, 9 PSYCHIATRY,
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 1, 177 (2011).
108
Council of Europe (2008), Combating Violence against Women: Minimum
Standards for Support Services https://www.coe.int/t/dg2/equality/domesticviolence
campaign/Source/EG-VAW-CONF(2007)Study%20rev.en.pdf (last visited 14
October 2019).
109
Article 56 of the Convention.
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Against Women (CEDAW Convention), 110 and ECtHR rulings, as they
could have a distinct impact upon the implementation of the
Convention’s obligations 111 The due diligence obligation imposed
upon CoE States regarding the investigation and gathering of evidence
in domestic violence cases has been a subject of ECtHR case law for
many years. 112 Although the Court’s primary concern has not been in
the use of expert evidence in dispelling myths surrounding domestic
violence, the Court has treated certain issues related to victim-centred
and gender-sensitive approaches to investigation.
First, the Court has consistently scrutinised states’ records
regarding conducting effective investigations into domestic violence
cases under various European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
articles. 113 It recognised that domestic violence cases are of a special
character, and that domestic violence can take many forms, including
psychological abuse. 114 As Judge Hüseynov noted in his concurring
opinion in Kurt v. Austria, the recent trend in the Court’s jurisprudence
has been “to deviate from an incident-based understanding of
domestic violence,” and instead to consider risk emanating from
domestic violence as from “a continuous practice of intimidation and
abuse.” 115 It remains to be seen whether this trend will be further
maintained in the Court’s practice. For now, it is interpreted as a
consistently applied requirement emanating from the Court’s case law
that a state is under an obligation to conduct an investigation with
special diligence into all acts of domestic violence that the specific
UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States
Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (Dec. 16, 2010), CEDAW/C/GC/28, https://www.
refworld.org/docid/4d467ea72.html.
111
Volodina v. Russia, App no. 41261/17, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 92–98 (2019).
112
Ilias Bantekas & Lutz Oette. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE
(Cambridge University Press, 2016), 506-507; See also Lee Hasselbacher. State
Obligations Regarding Domestic Violence: The European Court of Human Rights,
Due Diligence, And International Legal Minimums of Protection, Northwestern 8
Journal of International Human Rights 2, 200-1 (2010).
113
In particular, Article 2 and Article 8 of the Convention.
114
Valiulienė v. Lithuania, App no. 33234/07, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 69 (2013).
115
Case of Kurt v. Austria, App. no. 62903/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., Concurring opinion of
Judge Hüseynov, at 4 (2019).
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nature of domestic violence requires. 116 The authorities must make a
“serious attempt to establish the circumstances of the assaults” and
take an overall view of the series of violent acts. 117 This obligation also
relates to the fact that effective investigation is regarded as a measure
that is intended to prevent further violence, injuries, or loss of life. The
police must therefore analyse specific evidence concerning the reality
and the degree of danger posed by a domestic abuser. 118 The protective
function of investigation was emphasised in T.M. and C.M. v. Moldova,
a case in which the Court held that a law that requires injuries to be of
a certain degree of severity in order to initiate a criminal investigation
undermines the efficiency of protection afforded to victims. 119 The
Court also held that the police cannot raise the bar for evidence
required to launch criminal proceedings too high. 120 In Volodina v.
Russia, the Court also concluded that it is incompatible with Article 3
obligations to make a criminal investigation strictly dependent upon
the pursuance of complaints by the victim, given her particularly
vulnerable situation, 121 an outcome that is currently reinforced by the
Convention. 122 At a deeper level of analysis, the Court’s case law
provides practical signposts for a contextual approach to investigation
and evidence assessment. It is when an investigation is difficult, when
there are conflicting statements and little physical evidence, that the
Court is called upon to conduct a “context sensitive assessment of the
credibility of the statements made and for verification of all the
surrounding circumstances.” 123

Volodina v. Russia, at 92.
Id. at 97.
118
Liu v. Russia, App no. 42086/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007).
119
T.M. and C.M. v. The Republic of Moldova, App no. 26608/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 47
(2014).
120
Volodina v. Russia, at 98.
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Id. at 92-98.
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Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against
women and domestic violence art. 55, May 11, 2011, C.E.T.S. 210.
123
M. and C. v. Romania, App no 29032/04 (ECtHR 27 September 2011), at 116. See
also Maria Sjöholm. GENDER-SENSITIVE NORM INTERPRETATION BY REGIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW SYSTEMS (Brill | Nijhoff, 2018) 250-251. Context-sensitive
approach to evidence assessment is also required by Article 36(2) of the Convention
with respect of the prosecution of sexual offences.
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The Court has focused on at least three important aspects of
effective investigation, namely time, reasonableness, and diligence.
The investigation must not only be prompt but also thorough. 124 This
means that evidence concerning acts of domestic violence must be
secured 125 using reasonable means, such as witness testimony, on-site
inspection 126 and forensic evidence, 127 or an autopsy in case of injuries
causing death. 128 The nature and degree of fact-finding depends on the
circumstances of the particular case, and the minimum threshold of an
investigation’s effectiveness must be assessed with regard to the
practical realities of the work involved in the investigation. 129
However, even if it is not possible to reduce the investigation work to
a simple check-list, with regard to domestic violence, it is possible to
infer certain basic elements. 130 It is almost self-evident that if the police
lose time, they may not be able to secure the evidence needed. Passage
of time inevitably erodes the amount and quality of the evidence
available. 131 Therefore, a medical assessment and other forensic
evidence must be scheduled immediately after the reported
incident. 132 The same applies to rape cases, where in situ inspection
must be carried out promptly. 133 In P.M. v. Bulgaria, the Court
criticized the fact that urgent investigative measures, such as the
commissioning of an expert team in the case of rape and interviewing
the victim, had taken far too long to be deemed effective investigative
measures. 134
Finally, the Court attempted to tackle certain myths and
stereotypes linked to domestic violence, while couching them in terms
of discrimination issues. The Court held that it is unacceptable that the
Volodina v. Russia, at 92; Opuz, §§ 145-51, 168; T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic
of Moldova, § 46; Talpis, §§ 106 and 129.
125
Id.
126
D.K. v. Croatia, App no. 42418/10 (ECtHR, 24 October 2012), at 96.
127
P.M. v. Bulgaria, App no. 49669/07 (ECtHR, 24 January 2012), at 63-64.
128
Salman v. Turkey (ECtHR, 27 June 2000), at 105.
129
Velikova v. Bulgaria, (ECHR 2000-IV, 18 May 2000), at 20.
130
Id.
131
Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, App no. 46477/99, ECHR
2002‑II 86.
132
Volodina v. Russia, at 96
133
D.K. v. Croatia, at 103.
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P.M. v. Bulgaria, at 65-66.
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police hear the perpetrator’s version of the assaults only, and that they
should not trivialise reported events. 135 The police must also not seek
to assume the role of mediator and try to convince victims to return
home. 136 Drawn from analogy to rape cases, the Court stressed that the
allegation that a rape victim was under the influence of alcohol or
other circumstances concerning the victim’s behaviour or personality
cannot dispense the authorities from the obligation to effectively
investigate. 137 This would amount, in the Court’s view, to “the general
and discriminatory judicial passivity [of the police] creating a climate
that was conducive to domestic violence.” 138 Actions of the police or
the courts that run contrary to Article 14 of the ECHR would be
considered discriminatory and reflect an attitude on the basis of which
the police effectively condone violence against women and domestic
violence. 139
The Court has laid down certain procedural as well as
substantive requirements regarding investigation and evidence in
domestic violence cases, as well as in other cases involving violence
against women. However, there have been limitations as to what the
Court could achieve in promoting women’s access to justice, given the
factual situation of the cases presented to the Court and the particular
legal framework under which it adjudicates (namely the ECHR). For
example, as of January 2020, the Court has not adjudicated any case
combining killing in self-defence as a response to domestic violence.
However, in June 2019, the case of Natalya Tunikova was
communicated to the Court, in which Mrs. Tunikova was subject to a
series of assaults by her former partner, and on one occasion, she
grabbed a knife and stabbed him. Both suffered injuries, and Mrs.
Tunikova filed a private-prosecution complaint; however, she was
later found guilty of causing grievous bodily harm. A Moscow Court
found that her use of force in self-defence had not been justifiable. 140 It
remains to be seen how the Court will further develop standards of
Volodina v. Russia, at 97.
Case of A v. Croatia, App no. 55164/08 (ECtHR, 14 October 2010), at 94-104.
137
D.K. v. Croatia, at 101.
138
Opuz v. Turkey, at 191.
139
Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, App no. 3564/11 (ECtHR, 28 May 2013), at
89.
140
Tunikova v. Russia, App no. 55974/16, (Sep.12, 2016).
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access to justice for female victims of domestic violence. However, any
action by the Court in this regard will have to take account of several
serious limitations of certain inviolable rights of the perpetrator,
including Article 3 ECHR, which prescribes that torture, inhumane or
degrading treatment or punishment is prohibited in absolute terms,
irrespective of the circumstances or the victim’s behaviour. 141 From
today’s perspective, the Court’s results may seem moderate, reflecting
“common sense,” certain gender-neutral standards (forensic
evidence), and, at best, basic gender sensitivity.
The Convention goes two steps further than the ECHR
framework. It represents a development in international law, which is
“supported by the findings of modern psychology” and in which
domestic violence emerges “as an autonomous human rights
violation.” 142 The context in which the Convention is forged by
scientific evidence explaining the consequences and effects of violence
against women on health, 143 employment, 144 life outcomes, as well as
multi-generational trauma; 145 the causes of domestic violence; 146 the
vulnerabilities of certain victimised groups; the prevention of
victimisation and secondary victimisation; 147 in addition to the social
context in which the violence occurs and the context in which battered
women kill their abusive partners. 148

Bureš v. the Czech Republic, App no. 37679/08 (ECtHR, 18 October 2012), at 83.
Valiulienė v. Lithuania, App no. 33234/07 ECtHR (Mar. 26, 2013) (Pinto de
Albuquerque, concurring).
143
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146
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LANCET 359 (April 2002).
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The question remains as to how to integrate these findings in a
legal system, as finding a way of constructing procedural standards
and of balancing the procedural relationship between the perpetrator
and the victim in the light of these scientific findings seems necessary.
Furthermore, the legislator should consider how to construct
substantive legal rules against the backdrop of scientific findings that
clarify the context in which violence is taking place. It is also a question
of further policy choices to design a criminal justice system to help
victims to cope as best as possible with the consequences of crimes. In
any law reform prompted by a gendered understanding of violence, it
is also germane to ask how to account for the behaviour of the victim
in assessing the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator. In the most
difficult cases, a legislator may further inquire how to assess the
victim’s criminal responsibility, if scientific evidence can explain the
motive, intent, or inevitability of her/his conduct (state of mind). In
particular, the development of battered woman syndrome, the cycle of
violence, and learned helplessness in the late 1970s by Walker
represented a major breakthrough in understanding of criminal
behaviour in the context of domestic violence. 149 What general
criminal law rules should be adopted to reflect the scientific findings
as credibly as possible while avoiding sweeping conclusions about
victims of domestic violence? Could the Convention’s evidentiary
requirements have any bearing on how such criminal law rules are
construed? An answer to these questions can be provided by
examining certain common law jurisdictions that have methodically
considered similar issues in their reform processes in the past. In the
next part, the article will focus primarily on various solutions offered
to the question of how to reform criminal law and respond to cases
where an abused woman kills her domestic tormentor.
FROM EVIDENCE TO LAW REFORM, FROM LAW REFORM TO EVIDENCE
Since the 1950s, common law jurisdictions have
institutionalised a particular process of reforming laws by establishing
bespoke independent law reform commissions. 150 Law reform is
See Lenore E. A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE
DAME J. OF L., ETHICS & PUB. POL. 2, 321 (1992).
150
Rees, supra note 18.
149
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driven by the objective of simplifying, consolidating but also revising
and repealing the existing law. 151 Almost all major common law
jurisdictions with an established law reform commission have held
discussions about the gendered conceptualisation of self-defence as
well as other legal defences. In our analysis, we included the final
reports and recommendations of the law reform commissions of
Australia, England & Wales, Ireland and New Zealand 152 tackling the
use of self-defence by victims of long-term domestic violence, either as
part of a broader review of defences in criminal law, a review of the
laws of homicide, a legal response to domestic violence, or a review of
the laws of evidence. We did not consider reports that provided
general recommendations in domestic violence cases, such as
concerning child custody reform, review of property rights, or orders
of protection. 153
We searched through the outputs of all such commissions that
employ a law reform method modelled on reviewing the operation of
laws, receiving submissions from professionals as well as the general
public, conducting a comparative analysis as well as a literature

See Commonwealth Secretariat, CHANGING THE LAW. A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LAW
REFORM (2017).
152
We did not consider issues papers and discussion papers that are published before
a final report in the standard process of law reform, and that usually laid down options
for consideration but do not recommend a specific legislative option.
153
In that way, the 2017 Report of the Law Commission of Malawi on the Technical
Review of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, the 2010 Report of the Law
Reform Commission of the Cayman Islands “Protection against Domestic Violence”,
the 2005 Report of the Law Commission of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh on
the Proposed Law of Domestic Violence, the 1995 Report for Discussion “Domestic
Abuse: Towards an Effective Legal Response” of the Alberta Law Reform Institute
or the 1995 Report of Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia “From Rhetoric to
Reality: Ending Domestic Violence in Nova Scotia” are not studied in detail although
at one point the latter report mentions the Canadian landmark case of a battered
women killing her husband (R. v. Lavallee [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852). This article also does
not consider the 1997 Report of the New South Wales (NSW) Law Reform
Commission on Partial Defences to Murder: Diminished Responsibility, but considers
the joint report of the NSW and Australian Law Reform Commissions on Family
Violence – A National Legal Response. Finally, this report does not consider the 2000
Report on Self-Defence and Provocation of the Law Reform Committee of the
Northern Territory. We also did not consider changes to laws of self-defence induced
by a high court ruling in cases concerning battered women (Canada).
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review, as we considered this method particularly thorough. 154 This
method reflects the fact that the need for law reform may come from
the bottom up: from individual cases and the law that they develop, as
well as from the top – new scientific evidence and knowledge, as well
as legislative (policy) changes. 155 In the selected jurisdictions, law
reform in this area has come about as a reaction to the criticism of the
operation of the laws of self-defence as well as other defences in the
light of new or newly explained social context (criminological and
psychological scientific evidence), or to legal uncertainty, and
alternatively, to an identified bias in the operation of the laws
undermining the idea of fairness and equality before the law.
Particularly in the area of legal defences, the law reform method has
helped to demonstrate how a gendered reconsideration of a single
legal concept requires reconsideration of legal principles governing
the structure of that concept and causes a cascade effect. This, in turn,
requires specific evidentiary considerations. In the analysis below, we
omitted the part of the reports that dealt with the defence of
diminished responsibility as a partial defence to murder available to
those who were suffering from certain abnormalities of the mind, as it
requires case-specific psychological expert evidence, usually on posttraumatic stress disorder or depression. 156
1. New Zealand
The New Zealand Law Commission examined the issue of
domestic violence and defences in criminal law in three separate
reports. The first report, in 2001, dealt with “Some Criminal Defences
with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants.” The second, in
2007, treated “The Partial Defence of Provocation.” The third, from
2016, was entitled “Understanding Family Violence: Reforming the

See Burke & Byrne, supra note 19.
See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and
Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. OF PENN. L. REV. 2, 388-460
(1991).
156
Diminished responsibility is a statutory defence in England, New South Wales,
Queensland, Northern Territory. It has origins in Scottish common law in HM
Advocate v Dingwall (1867) 5 Irvine 466.
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Criminal Law Relating to Homicide,” and is currently awaiting a
legislative response.
In the most recent report, the Commission noted that there are
differences between the position of men and women in pleading selfdefence. In the Commission’s view, “[t]he failure to equally
accommodate the ways women use lethal force to defend themselves
or another constitutes a gender bias in the operation of the law.” 157
Persisting misconceptions of how family violence operates may affect
a jury’s assessment of the defendant’s credibility or the reasonableness
of his or her actions. 158 The Commission emphasised the need to
understand family violence as “a pattern of harmful behaviour with a
cumulative effect and a form of entrapment.” 159 The Commission
identified problems with imminence and a lack of alternatives, as two
concepts traditionally assisting in the reasonableness assessment, in
the context of family violence. 160 Focusing on the proof of the
immediacy requirement, the jury may be less likely to hear evidence
on relationship history, and even where the evidence of past abuse is
admitted it may work against the defendant. 161 In light of the evidence
reviewed, the Commission found that the immediacy requirement
may impede victims of family violence from relying on self-defence. 162
Therefore, the Commission proposed that a new provision should be
inserted into the Crimes Act 1961 to ensure that, where a person is
responding to family violence, self-defence may apply even if that
person is responding to a threat that is not imminent. 163
As regards the proportionality element of the defence, the
Commission observed that due to differences in size and strength,
women are likely to use a weapon, typically a kitchen knife, to defend
themselves against an abusive partner armed only with his fists. 164 The
proportionality requirement thus appears particularly problematic in
157
Understanding Family Violence: Reforming the Criminal Law Relating to
Homicide. Reforming the Criminal Law Relating to Homicide (NZLC R139, 2016), ¶
6.11.
158
Id. ¶ at 2.55
159
Id. at ¶ 6.17.
160
Id. at ¶¶ 6.16-6.87.
161
Id. at ¶ 6.19.
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Id. at ¶ 6.22.
163
Id. at ¶ 7.39.
164
Id. at ¶ 6.52.
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non-confrontational situations and in cases where simplistic
measuring of forces fail. Despite the difficulties that appeared in New
Zealand case law, the Commission concluded that the proportionality
requirement could accommodate victims of family violence, provided
there is a proper understanding of all the circumstances, as well as an
understanding of family violence that reflects contemporary social
science. 165
2. Australia
a) Victoria
In 2004, the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC)
published an extensive report on defences to homicide. The work took
account of the social context in which killings typically occur. The most
significant line of inquiry of the VLRC was whether, despite the
theoretical possibility that the common law doctrine of self-defence
could accommodate the family violence context and other relevant
evidence, the practice of the application of the legal concept of selfdefence failed to cover women who kill their abusive partners in selfdefence. 166
The VLRC recommended against the introduction of a
separate defence for persons who kill in response to family violence. It
concluded that reforms should focus on “ensuring that self-defence
properly accommodates women’s experiences, rather than on creating
a special defence for women who kill in response to family
violence.” 167 The VLRC’s recommendations resulted in adoption of the
Victorian Crimes (Homicide) Act, which came into effect in 2005,
amending the Crimes Act 1958. 168 The Act involved two key reforms: it
defined the law of self-defence in respect of homicide offences and
provided legislative guidance on the admissibility of family violence
Id. at ¶¶ 2.4, 7.80, 11.25.
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide, (Final Report, 2004),
at ¶¶ 3.1-3.9.
167
Id. at ¶ 3.26.
168
Danielle Tyson, Victoria’s New Homicide Laws: Provocative Reforms or More
Stories of Women ‘asking for it’? 23 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2, 203233 (2011).
165
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evidence in the context of homicide offences. 169 Since 2014, thanks to
further changes to the law, it is possible to rely on self-defence in cases
of family violence even where a person uses excessive force or the
person is responding to a harm that is not immediate, as long as the
person believed it to be a reasonable response in the circumstances as
s/he perceived them. 170 This legislation also amended relevant
evidence laws and reinforced jury directions to accommodate
considerations of family violence. 171
b) Queensland
In Queensland, following a recommendation by the
Queensland Law Reform Commission (QLRC), the Criminal Code
(Abusive Domestic Relationship Defence and Another Matter)
Amendment Act 2010 amended the Criminal Code by introducing a
new partial defence to murder of killing in an abusive domestic
relationship. The QLRC reviewed defences available to battered
women who kill as a part of a broader review of the excuse of accident
and the defence of provocation in 2008. 172 Its analysis focused, inter
alia, on modification of the law to obtain substantive gender
equality. 173 In the QLRC’s view, substantive gender equality may be
achieved by modifying the law where it inhibits deserving claims to
mitigation only because of rules derived from a particular gender
model of human behaviour. 174 However, the Commission refused to
distort the defence of provocation in an attempt to accommodate the
See Section 6 of the Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 that inserted new subdivision
1AA to the Crimes Act 1958 – Exceptions to Homicide Offences. The 2005 Act also
abolished the partial defence of provocation (Section 3 of the Crimes (Homicide) Act
2005). Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic) ss 3, 6.
170
See Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic).
171
See Charlotte King et al., Did Defensive Homicide in Victoria provide a Safety Net
for Battered Women Who Kill? A Case Study Analysis, 42 Monash Univ. L. Rev. 1,
138-178 (2016); see also Nayor & Tyson, Reforming Defences to Homicide in
Victoria: Another Attempt to Address the Gender Question, 6 Int’l J. for Crime, Just.
and Soc. Democracy 3, 72-87 (2017).
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QUEENSLAND L. REFORM COMM’N, A REVIEW OF THE EXCUSE OF ACCIDENT AND THE
DEFENCE OF PROVOCATION 297-300 (2008), https://www.qlrc.qld.gov.au/__data/
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position of a battered person who kills, as long as the circumstances in
which battered persons killed their abuser do not resemble a provoked
killing. 175 Therefore, it suggested to develop a separate defence for
battered persons that reflects scientific evidence about the effects of a
seriously abusive relationship on a battered person. 176 It presented
such a defence as gender neutral.
c) Tasmania
The Tasmanian Law Reform Institute (TLRI) noted that
“uncertainty about the availability of self-defence at trial means that
women tend to plead guilty to manslaughter in cases that
‘demonstrate strong defensive components on the facts’ and might
result in an acquittal on the basis of self-defence.” 177 In Tasmania, the
law of self-defence in the circumstances of domestic violence has thus
far remained untested. The TLRI therefore recommended that the law
in Tasmania should be reformed to allow self-defence to better
accommodate the claims of those who use violence in response to
domestic violence. 178 The Institute followed the Australian Law
Reform Commission in recognising broader policy issues behind the
law reform: an integrated approach to support of victims of domestic
violence. 179 However, crisis accommodation, counselling, or
protection are not enough. According to the TLRI, the criminal law
must also recognise the experience of victims of domestic violence who
themselves kill. 180 “This involves addressing wider consideration than
the substantive law of self-defence, such as relevant evidentiary
provisions and provisions in relation to jury directions.” 181 However,
the TLRI did not choose to follow the Queensland approach as regards
a separate partial defence of killing for self-preservation in a domestic
relationship. It considered the applicable law on self-defence to be
Id.at ¶ 21.131.
Id. at 501.
177
Tasmanian L. Reform Inst., Review of the Law Relating to Self-defence, ¶ 5.3.3
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sufficiently broad and flexible to accommodate the experience of
women in abusive relationships, as it focuses on the accused’s
perception of circumstances in assessing the reasonableness of the use
of force. Furthermore, unlike Queensland, Tasmania is a jurisdiction
with discretionary sentencing for murder. 182
3. England & Wales
In 2004, the Law Commission (England & Wales) published a
report on partial defences to murder. The Consultation Paper that
preceded the Commission’s report stated that special rules relating to
domestic killings may only be justified if there is medical or other
evidence which demonstrates a need and a proper basis on which to
ground such rules. 183 The report revealed that not all judges provided
directions to juries about the need to carefully consider the disparity
of strength and vulnerability between the defendant and the
offender. 184 The Commission invited the Judicial Studies Board to
consider providing a specimen direction for trial judges that would
direct juries to consider the relationship between the defendant and
the other party in the assessment of reasonableness and the elevated
view of danger that a defendant who experiences previous violence in
a relationship may have. 185 This came as a response to criticism of the
law of self-defence, which reposed on two arguments: first that the
requirement of reasonableness operated in an unreasonable way, if
conceived objectively. The assessment of reasonableness takes into
account the proportionality of the attack and defence and
accommodates only cases in which adversaries are of comparable
strength. 186 Second, cases in which abused persons kill their abusers
when they are asleep or otherwise defenceless fail to satisfy the
imminence requirement. 187 In the absence of a partial defence 188 of
Id. at ¶ 5.3.7.
L. COMM’N, PARTIAL DEFENCES TO MURDER ¶ 3.77 (2004).
184
Id.at ¶ 4.13.
185
It must be also noted that the issue may be removed from the jury and decided by
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excessive self-defence, the Commission concluded that the partial
defence of provocation (acting out of genuine fear), as recommended,
would be available. 189 The partial defence recommended by the
Commission introduced an objective test based on a person of
ordinary tolerance and self-restraint, and combined it with a partially
subjective requirement of two emotions, namely fear of serious
violence and anger. The Commission considered this to represent a
principled approach. 190
The UK is currently in the process of adopting a Domestic
Abuse Bill. 191 The Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill
suggested to the Government that a new clause be added to the Bill to
create a statutory defence for women whose offending is driven by
their experience of domestic abuse. The Government responded that it
has not yet been persuaded that the creation of a new defence
represented a practical or proportionate response in all circumstances
but agreed to give the proposal a further consideration in view of
recent development on the case law in the area. 192
4. Ireland
In 2009, the Law Reform Commission (LRC) of Ireland
published a report on defences in criminal law, in which it extensively
commented on the law of self-defence. One part of this discussion,
which concerned threshold requirements for self-defence – that is,
whether a minimum level of threat to a person should be required to
justify lethal defensive force – was dedicated to the issue of
imminence. As the LRC noted, “the rule [of imminence] has come
under considerable attack in recent years from those who feel that it
places undue emphasis on the time measurement between harm and
L. COMM’N, supra note 183, at ¶ 4.29.
Id. ¶ 4.25.
191
Although this part concerned only the law of England and Wales following the
chosen methodology, Scottish law is also a rich source of examples dealing with
women suffering from battered women syndrome in the context of the defence of
diminished responsibility. See Graham v HM Advocate [2018] HCJAC 57 [52]. See
Rachel McPherson, Battered Woman Syndrome, Diminished Responsibility and
Women Who Kill: Insights from Scottish Case Law, 83 J. CRIM L. 5, 1-13 (2019).
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defensive response at the expense of the underlying principle of
necessity,” especially in cases of killings in domestic violence. 193 The
LRC outlined three options for law reform: (i) a Presidential pardon,
(ii) a broadening of the imminence requirement that would either
include a presumption that the threat of harm faced by a woman is
always imminent or would result in a different understanding of the
concept of imminence such as one partially encompassing the concept
of inevitability, and (iii) abandoning the concept of imminence as a
threshold requirement. 194
The LRC recommended retaining the imminence requirement,
but that in assessing imminence, the jury or the court may take account
of the circumstances as the accused reasonably believed them to be. As
regards the defence of provocation, the LRC cited a number of authors
in support of the contention that the defence is gender biased. 195 The
LRC conceded that the defence needed to be reformed in a way that
diluted the requirement of immediacy, that is, sudden and temporary
loss of control, and that allowed for greater flexibility in dealing with
cases of homicides. 196 It recommended the introduction of a
remodelled defence that would combine a subjective and an objective
test. For the LRC, it was, however, clear that the requirements of
provocation “are firmly based on male norms and male emotions.” 197
Although the jurisdiction seemed to recognise cumulative provocation
in the context of domestic violence, the concept of sudden and
temporary loss of control appeared troublesome for women living
with domestic violence. 198 The LRC proposed that the immediacy
requirement should not be abolished, but that legislation should
provide for situations where the defence will not be negated if the act
causing death did not occur immediately after provocation. 199
However, the presence or absence of an immediate act represents a
relevant consideration that, in conjunction with other evidence may
L. REFORM COMM’N IRELAND, DEFENCES IN CRIMINAL LAW ¶ 2.100 (LRC 95-2009,
2009).
194
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195
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decide the question of lost self-control. 200 The LRC’s recommendations
have thus far not been implemented.
5. Discussion
In summary, all of the reports examined grounded the need for
reform in the context of the “deserving claims” of female defendants
and the “failure to equally” or “properly accommodate” women’s
experience in criminal justice systems. In the specific context of
common law jury trials, the assessment of the on-the-ground situation
revealed problems with juries’ appraisals of facts that contain
“persisting misconceptions,” are not adequately observant of “social
context,” circumstances of the accused or “differences between men
and women.” This evokes similar criticism of police work by the
ECtHR. The problem is therefore one of evidence evaluation. In the
reports analysed, the unfairness in the process of fact-finding is
examined in relation to the concept of reasonableness that is criticised
if conceived objectively as far as imminence and proportionality are
concerned. To this, two responses emerged. The first line of response
refused to reform the traditional defences and considered them flexible
enough to accommodate women’s perceptions. This line of response
therefore shifted the focus on how the evidence is admitted and
assessed in courtrooms. The second response introduced certain
changes in the substantive concept of the respective defences —
mingling subjective and objective elements of reasonableness — and
accompanied them with corresponding evidentiary rules (jury
directions) that would assist in the reasonableness assessment.
From the reports analysed, it becomes clear that evidence rules
may have a significant impact on the operation of defences. 201 Some of
the reports compiled by law reform bodies included a whole chapter
dedicated to evidence of relationships and domestic violence. The
VLRC recommended that some clarification should be provided
200
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See also AUSTRALIAN L. REFORM COMM’N, FAMILY VIOLENCE – A NATIONAL
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concerning what evidence may be relevant where there is a history of
prior violence to support a defence of self-defence or duress. 202 It
recalled that so-called relationship evidence may assist the jury in
assessing the state of the relationship between the pair or the state of
mind of the offender and the victim. Such evidence plays a role in
establishing mens rea. It helps to consider the accused’s actions in a
broader context that informs on the reasonableness of the actions in
light of the nature of the threat the accused faced, available options to
escape the violence, and the proportionality of the actions. 203 Since
2015, there is a provision under Part 6 of the Jury Directions Act 2015
(Vic) for a specific jury direction to be given at the start of the trial
where self-defence or duress are raised in the context of family
violence. 204 Also, Sections 322J and 33M of the Crimes Act 1958
(Victoria) allow for social framework evidence to be adduced, which
explains the nature and dynamics of family violence, and social,
cultural, or economic factors that impact upon the person affected by
domestic violence. The VLRC also had regard to a person’s cultural
background and social support structures, 205 which were deemed to
have a critical impact on the reasonableness assessment. In order to
ensure that the evidence is properly understood by jurors, expert
evidence on family violence is recommended. This may include both
general expert evidence, about the nature and effects of family
violence, and also case-specific expert evidence that would place the
situation of the accused and his/her reactions into the framework of
current knowledge about family violence. 206
In Tasmania, the Law Reform Institute recommended to
amend the Evidence Act 2001 (Tasmania) to include provisions based
on the Crimes Act 1958 that provide for a range of domestic violence
evidence to be admitted and to relate to the subjective and objective
components of Section 46 of the Criminal Code (Tasmania) on selfVLRC, supra note 166, at 132-42.
Id. at 137, ¶4.21.
204
The provisions were initially introduced into the Jury Directions Act 2013 (Vic) by
the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic). On 29 June
2015, the provisions were revised and included in the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic).
205
Specific groups of women such as women from rural areas, women with
disabilities, and people in same-sex relationships must be also considered. VLRC,
supra note 166, ¶ 4.24.
206
Id. at ¶ 4.32.
202
203
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defence. Despite the Institute’s view that the scope of the Evidence Act
2001 (Tasmania) was sufficient for evidence of domestic violence to be
admitted, setting out the admissibility and relevance of case-specific
as well as general evidence about the dynamics of domestic violence
to self-defence was considered to have an important declaratory
function. 207 The Institute was further of the view that such provision
would serve an educative function for the legal profession. More
importantly, the Institute subscribed to Bradfield’s opinion that
“expert evidence can tie together the varying accounts of witnesses by
providing an overarching conceptual framework of domestic violence
within which the individual incidents of violence can be positioned
and understood.” 208 Further, the Institute suggested that the approach
based on the Victorian model of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Victoria)
should be reproduced in Tasmania. Similar recommendations were
made by the Western Australian Law Reform Commission. The
Victorian model was also endorsed by the Australian Law Reform
Commission and the New South Wales Law Reform Commission in
the joint review of national legal responses to domestic violence.
Queensland is the only other Australian jurisdiction that has a
provision addressing the admissibility of evidence of family
violence. 209 In Queensland, the amendment brought to the Criminal
Code and the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld)210 after the QLRC’s
deliberations, has explicitly provided for the relevance of the full
circumstances of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased in assessing a new partial defence to murder of killing in an
abusive domestic relationship. 211 According to the amendment, a
history of acts of serious violence may include acts that appear minor
or trivial when considered in isolation. 212 In addition, in assessing the
reasonableness of the accused’s belief that his or her actions were
necessary for self-preservation, regard may be had to circumstances
TLRI, supra note 177, at ¶ 5.4.7.
Id. (citing Rebecca Bradfield, Understanding the Battered Woman Who Kills her
Violent Partner — The Admissibility of Expert Evidence of Domestic Violence in
Australia, 9 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCH. & LAW 177, 193 (2002)).
209
Id. at ¶ 5.4.3.
210
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 132B (Austl.).
211
See Criminal Code (Abusive Domestic Relationship Defence and Another Matter)
Amendment Act 2010 (Qld) (Austl.).
212
Id. at s 304B(4).
207
208
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including acts of the deceased that were not acts of domestic
violence. 213
In New Zealand, evidence of battered woman syndrome is
primarily used to correct juror misconceptions about family violence
and its effects on victims and is now regularly employed in criminal
trials. 214 A number of domestic cases underlined the importance of
expert evidence to explain the effects of battered woman syndrome
and to claim self-defence. In its 2001 Report, the Law Commission
recommended that instead of making reference to the term “battered
woman syndrome,” the nature and dynamics of the battering
relationship and the effects of battering should be used in this
context. 215 The Law Commission also noted that certain legal concepts
such as imminence and proportionality exclude the wider context,
including the cumulative and compounding nature of family violence
and the history of the relationship between the offender and the
deceased. 216 The Law Commission recommended to amend the
Evidence Act 2006 to provide for a broad range of family violence
evidence to be admitted in support of claims of self-defence and to
make it clear that evidence may be relevant to both the subjective and
objective elements under the relevant provisions. 217
One may observe a number of parallels between GREVIO’s
evaluations of Parties’ compliance with the Convention, as explained
in the preceding part, and the recommendations of the various law
reform commissions. In both clusters of sources, the focus is placed on
the understanding of the specificities of the context, nature and cycle
of domestic violence. The difference is that law reform commissions
draw specific implications of considering relationship-social
framework-case specific and general-expert-full circumstances
evidence on the assessment of reasonableness or other elements of
defences in tyrannicide cases. Will it be possible to infer similar
implications for substantive laws of Parties to the Convention based
on the Convention’s evidentiary requirements?
See Rebecca Campbell, Domestic Relationship Evidence in Queensland: An
Analysis of a Misunderstood Provision, 42 UNIV. OF N.S.W L. J. 2, 430 (2019).
214
New Zealand Law Commission, supra note 157, at ¶ 6.69.
215
Id. at ¶ 6.76.
216
Id. at ¶ 6.85.
217
Id. at ¶ 7.87; see id. at 9.
213
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EVIDENCE AS A PATTERN CHANGER
The above analysis illustrates that there are a number of
possible considerations in searching for the gendered effect of the
Convention’s evidentiary requirements concerning domestic criminal
laws, even in situations in which there is no explicit provision dealing
with self-defence or other defences to criminal responsibility of victims
of domestic violence in the text of the Convention itself. 218 Instead of
first considering a policy question of gender “fairness” in the operation
of laws of defences or of the integrated approach to victims of violence
against women 219 (a broad analytical question), one may begin by
looking at where the obligation to consider certain types of evidence
may manifest itself in domestic criminal laws (a narrow analytical
question). What follows is essentially a summary of all possible
relationships between evidence-substance-procedure, produced on
the basis of an analysis of the law reform commissions’ reports
discussed above.
The first consideration is based on a hypothesis that domestic
laws on self-defence (or other defences) 220 of States Parties are gender
biased as they stand. It accepts that the laws were modelled on male
behaviour in confrontational situations, and do not encompass
women’s killing of abusive partners. For example, they require the
defence to show that the threat that was averted by the act of selfdefence was imminent or proportional in an objective sense. Therefore,
even very broad and general evidentiary rules, prescribing that
evidence can be anything that can help clarify a case and can be freely
evaluated may not accommodate situations of killings by persons who
See AYA GRUBER, THE DUTY TO RETREAT IN SELF-DEFENSE LAW AND VIOLENCE
WOMEN, OxfordHandbooks Online (July 2017) https://www.oxford
handbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935352.001.0001/oxfordhb-978019
9935352-e-5 (specifically as regards the evidentiary strategy of introducing expert
evidence).
219
As illustrated by the considerations of the Tasmanian Law Reform Institute. See
TLRI, supra note 177.
220
It is, however, also interesting to consider that the defence of provocation is
regarded as a defence that traditionally protects men’s honour. According to Article
42 of the Convention, ‘honour’ shall not be regarded as justification for acts of
violence covered by the scope of Convention. In other words, the compatibility of the
defence of provocation and the Convention may be put into question.
218
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have been abused in intimate relationships over a long period. 221 This
means that even new scientific evidence and research that attempts to
better understand and explain killings in abusive relationships or
evidence gathered in individual cases would not “fit” the law of selfdefence and enable the abused defendant to benefit from such a
defence. As such, the law and the resulting practice may be deemed
unsuitable from the perspective of the Convention’s requirements.
The second consideration is based on a hypothesis that
domestic laws on self-defence (or other defences) can theoretically
encompass the experiences of women who were abused in intimate
relationships and killed their partners; however, the practice excludes
such women from benefiting from these laws. This may be due to very
strict domestic evidentiary practice that renders evidence of social,
cultural, psychological, or economic contexts inadmissible or treats
evidence of physical violence as essential. 222 The question is then how
the evidentiary requirements under the Convention may change the
unsuitable practice that may be considered gender biased. A focus on
the doctrinal content of laws of defences could be accompanied by
appropriate legal professional education on evidentiary issues under
the Convention or express guidance about the potential relevance of
domestic violence evidence in the context of homicides committed by
abused persons. 223 This is also obvious from GREVIO’s monitoring
output, in which it encouraged training of law enforcement agencies
as to how to handle cases of violence against women, on the basis of a
model strongly anchored to a gendered understanding of violence. 224
Although recognising that the primary purpose of the
evidentiary rules under the Convention is to secure vital evidence, 225
decreases in the level of attrition rates, and enhance conviction rates in
the prosecution of domestic violence and other forms of violence
221
Michael Wutz, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction in Cases of Domestic Violence:
A comparative analysis of Scottish and German Criminal Procedure, 76 ABERDEEN
STUDENT L. REV. 2, 76 (2011).
222
Gasimova, supra note 103.
223
Cf. ALRC, supra note 201.
224
GREVIO — Report Italy, supra note 96.
225
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ON
PREVENTING AND COMBATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ¶
255 (Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 210, 2011), https://rm.coe.int/16800d383
a.
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against women and to establish protection measures; 226 the third
question to be explored is for what purpose the contextual evidence
under the Convention should be considered in cases of women’s
killings of abusive partners. 227 Evidence plays a role in each aspect of
a criminal case: from the investigation, to establishing the motive of
the offender, to sentencing. It can affect criminal responsibility (selfdefence), the classification of offences (murder versus manslaughter),
guilt (intentional versus unintentional killing), and/or sentencing
(mitigating circumstances). Since the evidentiary requirements and the
gendered understanding of violence are included under the chapter on
investigation, prosecution, procedural law, and protective measures,
it can be suggested that evidence in domestic violence cases should
play a more prominent role in legal appraisals of the relevant facts than
at the sentencing stage. The contextual evidence under the Convention
may potentially lead to diminishing or excluding the criminal
responsibility of women killing their abusive partners. It is unclear,
however, what result from the perspective of substantive criminal law
provisions will be deemed sufficient under the Convention. This also
means that evidentiary rules cannot secure a completely unified
application of substantive laws.
In light of the potential variability at the general theoretical
level, we endeavoured to demonstrate the variable effects of the
Convention’s evidentiary requirements in two jurisdictions, namely
France and Germany. These represent two of the largest European
jurisdictions that are Parties to the Convention. They are also two
jurisdictions operating the classic European continental inquisitorial
system of criminal justice, 228 and both have also recently considered
criminal law reform regarding the criminal responsibility of women
killing their domestic abusers. 229 Unlike common law jurisdictions,
GREVIO — Report Finland, supra note 98.
Evidentiary rules should be considered for legal appraisals of aggravating
circumstances since they are explicitly provided for in Article 46 of the Convention.
228
See John Spencer, Adversarial vs Inquisitorial Systems: Is There Still Such a
Difference?, 20 INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS. 601, 601-616 (2016).
229
In France, INSPECTION GÉNÉRALE DE LA JUSTICE, MISSION SUR LES HOMICIDES
CONJUGAUX 1-36 (2019); COMMISSION NATIONALE CONSULTATIVE DES DROITS DE
L’HOMME, AVIS SUR LES VIOLENCES CONTRE LES FEMMES ET LES FÉMINICIDE 1-25
(2016). In Germany, BUNDESMINISTER DER JUSTIZ, ABSCHLUSSBERICHT DER
226
227
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both countries employ the free evaluation of evidence principle in
criminal cases (libre appréciation). 230 Generally, courts in both France
and Germany have the responsibility for determining facts, and
should accept evidence of all facts that are necessary for reaching a
decision. 231 Neither Germany nor France, has any code containing a
systematic set of rules of evidence, akin to the common law model. It
is therefore not possible to reform evidentiary rules in a fashion similar
to New Zealand, Queensland, or Tasmania as seen above. It may,
however, be possible to flexibly change the evidentiary practice of
courts, for example, by regularly summoning experts on domestic
violence to tyrannicide cases. This is also one of the limitations of the
fact-finding process in Germany and France: judges cannot consider
social framework, psychological, or other scientific evidence on their
own, but such evidence must be always channelled into the criminal
justice process via an expert testimony. 232 It is the judge who selects
the experts to be consulted in criminal cases. 233
1. German law
Depending on the particular case, evidence endorsed by the
Convention may be used in diminishing the criminal responsibility of
a woman who kills her abusive husband, either from the aggravated
form of murder, to the basic offence, or to a killing of still lesser gravity.
This may be done in a number of ways. For example, the
German Strafgesetzbuch recognises murder under aggravating
circumstances (Mord), ordinary murder (Totschlag), and murder under
EXPERTENGRUPPE ZUR REFORM DER TÖTUNGSDELIKTE (§§ 211 – 213, 57a StGB) 1910 (2015).
230
CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] ART. 428
(FR.).
231
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 244(2),
https://dejure.org/gesetze/StPO/244.html.
232
See T. Weigend, The Potential to Secure a Fair Trial Through Evidence Exclusion:
A German Perspective, in DO EXCLUSIONARY RULES ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL? A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EVIDENTIARY RULES 72 (Sabine Gless & Thomas
Richters eds., 2019); see also CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] [CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CODE] ART. 434 (FR.).
233
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 73(1), https://
dejure.org/gesetze/StPO/74.html.
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mitigating circumstances (minder schwerer Fall des Totschlag). 234 Murder
under aggravating circumstances is defined by the motive or means by
which it is perpetrated or by the fact that it is committed to cover up
another offence. It, inter alia, encompasses the killing for pleasure,
sexual gratification, out of greed, or otherwise “base motives.” 235 It
does not necessarily punish premeditation. However, importantly
from the perspective of abused women, it also encompasses murder
committed by stealth, in an insidious (perfidious; heimtückisch) manner
that exploits the fact that the victim is not expecting the attack, for
example because he is asleep. 236 As such, it has been suggested that the
current version of §211 Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) disadvantages
physically weaker persons, such as women, who defend themselves
by taking advantage of an opportunity to engage in an unexpected
attack. 237 This is reminiscent of similar considerations made by the
Law Commission of England and Wales, as well as the reports from
Ireland and New Zealand concerning the operation of the imminence
requirement. It has been suggested that the requirement of
insidiousness results from a legal-policy need, but it is considered too
wide as it undesirably covers some women’s killings
(Haustyrranmordfälle) and at the same time, too narrow, as it excludes
infants and unconscious people. 238 Moreover, it is not unusual for any
perpetrator to exploit the weaknesses of his or her victim. As such, to
regard the “honourable duel” as a normal, standard case is
mistaken. 239 In 2015, a group of experts established under the auspices
of the Federal Ministry of Justice considered a reform of homicide
STRAFGESTZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE] § 211, https://dejure.org/gesetze/StGB/
211.html; id. at § 212, https://dejure.org/gesetze/StGB/212.html; id. at § 213,
https://dejure.org/gesetze/StGB/213.html.
235
Id. § 211(2). Base motives may for example include a scenario under which a
daughter is killed by a family member in order to safeguard family honour). See also
GREVIO — Report Italy, supra note 96 (GREVIO takes positive note of this
legislative development, as well of the consolidated case law in Italy which tends to
harshen criminal punishment under the aggravating circumstance of futile motives
(citing Id. at § 61(1), https://dejure.org/gesetze/StGB/61.html)).
236
DEM BUNDESMINISTER DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, supra note 229,
at 2.
237
Id. at 2.
238
Id. at 19.
239
DEM BUNDESMINISTER DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, supra note 229,
at 41.
234
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offences under § 211-213 StGB. A part of this group advocated to
remove “insidiousness” as a characteristic of the aggravated form of
murder. 240 The reason was that the socio-legal disapproval of insidious
murders had been the same as in “normal” killings, and there had been
no compelling reason to privilege an aggressive approach over a
cunning one. 241 The expert group also admitted that
Haustyrranmordfälle show a conspicuous proximity to self-defence or
necessity, so that qualification of murder is hardly justified. This led
the experts to consider the supplementation of the “insidiousness”
characteristics with the “exploitation of defencelessness existing for
other reasons” (Ausnutzung einer aus anderen Gründen bestehenden
Schutzlosigkeit). 242
Under § 213 StGB, murder under mitigating circumstances is
an intentional murder provoked by rage resulting from maltreatment
or serious insult made by the victim and immediate loss of selfcontrol. 243 Application of this provision would diminish the sentence
from that attached to “ordinary” murder. 244 This may evoke the partial
defence of provocation that diminished the criminal responsibility
from murder to manslaughter as considered in the common law
jurisdictions discussed above. Theoretically, a woman killing her
husband may be charged with murder under mitigating circumstances
that carries a lower sentence, and her sentence may be further
diminished by another set of facts to a suspended sentence. 245
However, where such mitigating circumstances are not provided, and
charging that woman under the aggravated form of murder would
produce a prima facie injustice, it seems that it is possible under German
law to resort to the so-called legal consequence solution
(Rechtsfolgenlösung). 246 A Regional Court, for example, has mitigated
Id. at 19
Id.
242
Id. at 42.
243
Similarly, to the provocation defence as a partial defence to murder under common
law.
244
ALAN REED & MICHAEL BOHLANDER, LOSS OF CONTROL AND DIMINISHED
RESPONSIBILITY: DOMESTIC, COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 939
(2011) (ebook).
245
Id. at 953.
246
BUNDESGERICHTSHOF [BGH] [FEDERAL COURT OF JUSTICE] MAY 19, 1981,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES [BGH] 30, 105 (1981) (Ger.).
240
241
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the woman’s sentence for “extraordinary circumstances” in just such a
case. 247
Depending on the particular case, evidence endorsed by the
Convention may also be used in excluding the criminal responsibility
of a woman killing her abusive husband, for example under conditions
specified for self-defence and necessity. In principle, self-defence
(Notwehr) and necessity (Notstand) would be available to abused
women in German law. 248 As in common law jurisdictions, the
problem is that both defences require an imminent attack
(threat/danger) to be averted. 249 In principle, self-defence
presupposes necessity – the defensive action is the only and the least
intrusive means to terminate an unlawful attack. 250 Necessity, on the
other hand, presupposes proportional means of averting the danger. 251
Moreover, both defences employ certain proportionality limitations
(Gebotenheit/Abwägung der widerstreitenden Interessen), 252 which may be
further strengthened in light of particular social-ethical norms such as
a special relationship between the victim and the defendant, including
husband and wife. 253 Earlier case-law of the Federal Court of Germany
(Bundesgerichtshof) required spouses under certain circumstances to
refrain from methods of defence that would prove reliable but fatal,
even where less fatal methods would be less effective. 254 The
Bundesgerichtshof no longer requires spouses to suffer at least minor

DEM BUNDESMINISTER DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, supra note 229,
at 3.
248
STRAFGESTZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE] §§ 32-35, https://dejure.org/gesetze/StG
B. See Bohlander, supra note 244, at 944.
249
However, not Notstand as a defence per STRAFGESTZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE]
§ 35, https://dejure.org/gesetze/StGB/35.html.
250
Kai Ambos and Stefanie Bock, Germany, in Alex Reed & Michael Bohlander, eds.
GENERAL DEFENCES IN CRIMINAL LAW: DOMESTIC AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
231 (Ashgate, 2014).
251
STRAFGESTZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE] §§ 34(1), https://dejure.org/gesetze/
StGB/31.html.
252
Id. (It is accepted that a gross discrepancy between the interests protected or harms
caused on the side of the victim as well as defendant do not give rise to the right to
self-defense); see also Bohlander, supra note 244, at 905.
253
See Bohlander, supra note 244, at 947.
254
MARKUS D. DUBBER & TATJANA HÖRNE, CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 402 (Oxford University Press, 2014).
247
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injuries before employing more serious means of protection. 255
However, it is generally expected that a woman should make certain
sacrifices, such as calling the police first, leaving her home, and going
to a women’s shelter, unless this cannot be reasonably expected
because she has children who cannot be left behind, she has financial
problems, or she is at higher risk of social stigmatisation. 256 In certain
circumstances, it can be legitimately expected that she undergoes a
certain danger (in case of the defence of necessity). 257 In a landmark
case, the Bundesgerichstshof required the defendant to retreat before
striking in self-defence, which is noteworthy because the defendant
aggravated the situation by displaying a knife that further provoked
her abusive husband. 258 On the other hand, with respect to women in
abusive relationships, it cannot be legitimately expected to “litigate a
divorce or the institutionalisation of a cruel and violent husband if
during the proceedings the violence would continue.” 259
Under German law, the defence of excessive self-defence
(Überschreitung der Notwehr) is made available to persons who exceed
the reasonable limits of self-defence in confusion, fear, or terror. 260 The
purpose of this defence is to exonerate a psychologically stressed
(asthenic) state of mind that seriously impacted the defendant’s selfcontrol. 261 Scientific evidence would be crucial to make the defence
successful. The defence is, however, only available where the
defendant went beyond the necessity requirement or violated the
socio-ethical restrictions of the defence. 262 The concept of excessive
self-defence under German law contrasts with that of excessive selfdefence in common law, which has a status of partial defence, merely
reducing the charge from murder to manslaughter, 263 and with the
See Bohlander, supra note 244, at 947.
Id. at 950.
257
Id. at 920.
258
BUNDESGERICHTSHOF [BGH][FEDERAL COURT OF JUSTICE] APR.18, 2002, NEUE
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
̈ STRAFRECHT [NSTZ] 509, 2002 (Ger.).
259
See Bohlander, supra at 244, at 916.
260
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 33, translation at https://germanlaw
archive.iuscomp.org/?p=752 (Ger.).
261
Bohlander, supra note 244, at 909.
262
Ambos & Bock, supra note 250, at 227.
263
The history of the concept of excessive self-defence is quite rocky and was not
considered in this article in detail in the part dealing with common-law jurisdictions.
255
256

2021 ISTANBUL CONVENTION'S EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS 259
offence of defensive homicide as legislated for in the Crimes
(Homicide) Act 2005 on the basis of the VLRC’s recommendations. 264
The concept of excessive self-defence under German law may seem
akin to the construction of self-defence upon a combination of
subjective and objective elements necessary for its assessment, an
approach suggested by the LRC of Ireland and by the Law
Commission of England and Wales.
It is also possible that an abused woman was mistaken about
the ambit of permissible actions under self-defence. This may be
considered as putative self-defence, and must be assessed in the
context of the severity of the abuse suffered and the time for
consideration of these actions. 265 In this context, it is important to note,
that the Bundesgerichstshof in the Haustyrranmordfall considered each
action undertaken by the abused woman separately and not in a
broader context, as the Convention would require. 266 Commentators
note that this can be explained by a lack of expert opinion on the
situation regarding battered women. 267 Putative self-defence may
potentially lead to avoiding criminal responsibility for intentional

The defence is currently available in Ireland by common law (People (AttorneyGeneral) v Dwyer [1972] IR 416), South Australia by statute (see the South Australian
Criminal Law Consolidation (Self-Defence) Amendment Act 1997 s. 15(2)), in New
South Wales (Crimes Act 1900, s. 421), Western Australia (Criminal Code, s. 248(3)),
New South Wales (Crimes Act 1900, s. 421) and in South Australia (Criminal Law
Consolidation Act 1935, s. 15(2)). The defence is not available in New Zealand,
Tasmania the Northern Territory, Queensland and Canada. In the England and Wales,
Law Commission proposed to reintroduced the defence in 1989 (English Law
Commission. A Criminal Code for England and Wales, no 177, HMSO, London),
however the defence has not been introduced. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION.
BATTERED DEFENDANTS VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WHO OFFEND, Preliminary
Paper 41; see also Mirko Bagaric, Australia, in Alex Reed & Michael Bohlander, eds.,
GENERAL DEFENCES IN CRIMINAL LAW: DOMESTIC AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
189 (Ashgate, 2014).
264
Crimes Act 1958, s. 9AD (Austl.).
265
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE] § 32, https://dejure.org/gesetze/StGB/
32.html (It is a “mistake about the ambit of permissible reactions under duress.”);
Bohlander, supra note 244, at 951.
266
BUNDESGERICHTSHOF [BGH] [FEDERAL COURT OF JUSTICE] MAY 19, 1981,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES [BGH] 30, 105 (1981) (Ger.); see also
Dubber & Hörne, supra note 254, at 419.
267
Dubber & Hörne, supra note 254, at 418.
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2. French law
Similar to German law, the French Code pénal differentiates the
basic offence of homicide and aggravated forms of homicide. 269 The
substantive construction is, however much more simplistic. There is
no mitigated offence of homicide. The basic offence of homicide
requires intention. 270 An aggravated form is constructed so as to
include actions that have a certain relationship to another criminal
offence, actions that are premeditated (assasinat), or actions that are
directed against certain specified victims. 271 An aggravated form of
murder also includes an act committed by the victim’s spouse or
partner. 272 Although the intention of the legislator was to become
tougher on violence committed against women, it is possible that a
battered woman killing her abuser would be covered by the same
provision. 273 Since France abolished minimum penalties in 1994,
homicide in the basic or aggravated form is no longer mandatorily
punishable by imprisonment. 274 However, in France, a mandatory
safety period for aggravated homicide prevents the individualisation
of sentences to a certain degree, namely probationary release. 275 Also,
in 2010, an amendment to Article 132-80 of the Code pénal was
introduced, which increased the sanctions when a crime was
committed by the (former) spouse or partner. 276
French law, just like German law, recognises several defences
to criminal responsibility, with the exception of the Überschreitung der
Notwehr, which does not find an analogy in the Code pénal. Under the
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE] § 16(1), https://dejure.org/gesetze/
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defence of duress in French law (contrainte), a person is not criminally
responsible when acting under the influence of a force or a constraint
which he or she could not withstand. 277 Such could possibly
encompass fears of specific reprisals from the abusive husband
(external psychological constraint). 278 In common law systems, this
would correspond to a defence of necessity (duress of
circumstances). 279 Consequently, the provision of duress could be
favourable to victims of domestic violence, placed under the influence
of conjugal terror in a situation of psychological subjugation and
extreme dependence, thereby rendering it dangerous to break the
spiral of domination. 280 This construct has, however, never been tested
in the case-law of French courts. 281 It has been recently proposed by
the National Consultation Commission on Human Rights that duress
be more commonly accepted by French courts as a defence in the
context of domestic violence. 282
It is also possible to consider the defence of necessity, requiring
satisfaction of the requirements of imminence and proportionality. 283
Similar to German law, the danger that is being averted must have
truly necessitated the defence. If the offender could have resorted to
other means of safeguarding her interests, she could not avail of the
defence, “unless this was the best course of action.” 284 A lawful use of
self-defence (légitime défense) requires an unlawful attack; however, an
attack on peoples’ morals is also sufficient. 285 Comparable to German
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law, self-defence requires proportionate responses to present or
imminent attacks, i.e. no time lapse is permitted between the attack
and the response. 286 These requirements also recently came under
review by the National Consultation Commission on Human Rights,
which recommended that self-defence be modified by integrating
elements of individualised assessments such as size, age, sex, previous
relationship, or physical capacities of the parties involved. 287 In
addition, a recent amendment of the French Code pénal proposed to
create a separate complete defence to criminal responsibility if the
offender experiences psychic or neuropsychic impairment due to
repeated domestic violence that alters her discernment or affects her
control over her actions. 288 In this way, it is possible to recognise
domestic violence as an atypical situation, a product of which is
extraordinary psychology that tears apart learned patterns of
behaviour. 289
3. Discussion
The above presents an outline of possible venues where the
types of evidence endorsed by the Convention (e.g. concerning the
proper understanding of the nature and cycle of domestic violence, of
its dynamics, and how myths and stereotypes around victims’
behaviour may be dispelled) may be subsumed or channelled into. A
number of key points emerge.
First, France and Germany have both considered certain
reforms to their criminal laws that would better accommodate the
situations of women killing their domestic abusers.
Second, both jurisdictions include laws governing selfdefence, applying similar elements for its assessment. It is likely that
without substantive changes to the concept of self-defence,
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comparable to those suggested in France, evidence endorsed by the
Convention may be difficult to adduce during legal assessments in
court.
Third, the respective classifications and elements of homicide
offences in France and Germany are fundamentally different. In any
jurisdiction, where such differentiation exists, evidence considered
under the Convention could potentially be used to avoid the gravest
homicide charge or even to make a legal appraisal of the factual
situation to the benefit of the mitigated form of homicide. In this way,
Germany offers a more varied selection of potential application of the
evidence.
Fourth, in Germany, it would be certainly possible to consider
social framework evidence that helps to better understand the
circumstances of battered defendants under the so-called
Rechtsfolgenlösung.
Fifth, social framework evidence could also play a role in the
context of assessing the German concept of putative self-defence. Some
of the observed practices have clearly been non-compliant with the
Convention, such as the non-contextual assessment of battered
women’s situations in claims of putative self-defence by German
courts.
Sixth, in Germany, on the basis of the evidence endorsed by
the Convention, it could be equally possible to downplay certain
requirements concerning the level of danger and attacks a female
defendant needs to demonstrate in order to successfully plead
necessity or self-defence.
Seventh, in both jurisdictions, there is a risk that relevant facts
will be subsumed under certain legal categories in which the context
of any history of a domestic violence relationship is irrelevant, for
example insidiousness in German law or whether the victim of the
homicide was the defendant’s husband in French law. Such categories
may automatically aggravate the criminal responsibility of the
defendant. If the relevant facts are shown, the legal assessment is
inescapable. For that reason, a reform of such, seemingly genderneutral and potentially gender-biased, legal categories were proposed
by the expert bodies.
Eighth, it should be noted that there are also other legal
categories that provide a space for contextual (social framework)
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evidence. Examples include the mitigated form of murder (§ 213 StGB)
or excessive self-defence (§ 33 StGB).
Ninth, and final, French criminal law is more compact and
integrated, and therefore creates fewer apertures for contextual
evidence to slip through. The defence of duress could provide such an
opportunity (Article 122–2 Code pénal). However, for now, it may seem
more promising for contextual evidence to wait for the new defence,
applicable in cases of repeated domestic violence, to be legislated for.
The above demonstrates that evidence and substantive legal
rules interact on at least four levels: first, during the investigation
phase, the police and the prosecutor must gather evidence and identify
all of the relevant circumstances that relate to the criminal offence.
After the establishment of the factual side of the case, one may proceed
with the legal appraisal of the relevant facts. Second, elements of legal
rules may require certain types of proof, such as the proof of
imminence; therefore, certain facts must be “found” to satisfy the legal
definition. Third, legal rules may be crafted in a bottom-up process, in
which a rule is formulated based on individual cases (such as pub
brawls involving men of equal size presented the initial model for the
contemporary rule on self-defence). Fourth, legal rules may be crafted
in a top-down process, in which a legal norm is created on the basis of
scientific evidence of social or other phenomena, such as clinical
psychological, medical, criminological, or social framework evidence
that would relax the imminence requirement. 290 However, the
emphasis on doctrinal coherence may present challenges to such an
evidence-law interaction. 291 New legal rules may then require a change
in evidentiary rules on their own motion, such as expanding the
admissibility rules that would allow for the inclusion of evidence of
history of violence, contextual evidence, and other types of evidence.
Counter-clockwise, evidentiary rules and practice, as required by
international treaties, may be capable of provoking a change in a
(substantive) legal rule, such as that governing self-defence.
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CONCLUSION
International law no longer consists exclusively of a system in
which the interests protected are vastly different to those protected at
national level. However, international society is not one that lends
itself to coherent, homogenous and stable propositions. 292 In the field
of women’s rights, the Istanbul Convention is a leading example of the
problems that may arise in the context of a one-size-fits-all model, even
on a regional level. Evidentiary requirements under the Convention
that reflect the latest social science research represent a unique driver
of change. In the case of the Convention, such scientific evidence
derived from the research is presumed to seep deep into domestic laws
and individual cases. However, problems arise when evidence
endorsed by the Convention can be subsumed under several domestic
legal concepts simultaneously. Problems also arise when there is no
general or residual category under which evidence may be considered
and found legally relevant. Furthermore, even if the Convention sees
charging a woman acting against her abuser as secondary
victimisation, there is a long way to travel from the legal classification
of such an act as intentional killing, to killing under mitigating
circumstances, to unintentional killing and ultimately to avoiding
criminal responsibility based on the evidence presented, as implicitly
envisaged by the Convention.
However, the latest social science, medical, and other research
drives compliance and reform. In criminal law, it justified reforms to
self-defence, including the removal of the imminence requirement or
changes to the defence of provocation. In certain cases, it also
necessitated express provisions for the leading evidence about
domestic violence that was often misunderstood. The question
therefore remains in which direction the evidentiary requirements
under the Convention, which include evidence with significant
consequences when admitted at trial, actually point. 293 Do they point
in the direction of the exclusion of criminal responsibility of women
who kill their abusers in extreme cases? Such a question is open to
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domestic debates by individual Parties to the Convention. The
evidentiary requirements under the Convention may be capable of
fostering a discussion about the gendered operation of self-defence in
the domestic law of Parties or may invite domestic judicial actors to
reflect upon the gender-neutral applicability of legal categories that
mitigate criminal responsibility. Next, sentencing considerations may
open. Notably, the Australian examples may offer indications as to
what form such deliberations can take.
The authors of this article believe that such debates should
include many different aspects of the issue, 294 including support
available to victims of domestic violence, and hence the Parties’
compliance with this requirement under the Convention. 295 They also
believe that if the Convention should prescribe the criminalisation of
certain offences, it must also explicitly provide for exclusion from
criminal responsibility. “Despite the centrality of concern for battered
[women] in much contemporary discussion in criminology and the
criminal law [more broadly], it appears that there is still substantial
research to be done to clarify [all] circumstances in which [female]
victims of [domestic] violence kill their abusive partners.” 296
Meanwhile, in Ireland, Italy, or Australia, cases of women who took
the law into their own hands continue to re-appear and resonate in the
public sphere. 297

See Lysova, supra note 80, at 508; Australian Law Reform Commission, supra
note 201.
295
See McColgan, supra note 82, at 529. But see FIONA BROOKMAN, UNDERSTANDING
HOMICIDE 1743 (2005) (indicating that such support may not suffice in every case).
296
See McMahon, supra note 290.
297
See Natasha Reid, Woman possibly under deadly attack from boyfriend when
killing occurred, judge hears, BREAKING NEWS (July 22, 2019) https://www.breaking
news.ie/ireland/woman-possibly-under-deadly-attack-from-boyfriend-when-killingoccurred-judge-hears-938645.html; Chris Bayes, Teenage girl who killed abusive
father released after prosecutors say she acted in self-defence, INDEPENDENT (May
22, 2019) https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/deborah-sciacquatorilorenzo-killed-abusive-father-monterotondo-italy-a8925631.html; see also Giovanni
Torre, Landmark Australian ruling allows woman who murdered her abusive partner
out of jail eight years early, TELEGRAPH (September 26, 2019) https://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/2019/09/26/landmark-australian-ruling-allows-woman-murderedabusive-partner/.
294

